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INTRODUCTION

The past two decades have witnessed a growing body of empirical
studies of dispute processing. A significant number of these articles
form a distinct type of literature which we call "evaluations." Evaluations report assessments of existing dispute processing programs in a
form which contributes to our general knowledge of dispute processing.
* Hewlett Fellow, Dispute Processing Research Program, University of WisconsinMadison. I am grateful to Marc Galanter, David Trubek, Cathy Meschievitz and Tom
Tylerm for their critical comments on this paper. I am also indebted to the fellowship
support I received from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation through the Dispute
Processing Research Program of the Institute for Legal Studies, University of WisconsinMadison.
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Their production and distribution involve the combined effort of policy
makers, dispute processing professionals, and academics. Policy makers, professionals, and academics are also the primary consumers of this
literature.
Published evaluations of dispute processing programs are now so
numerous that it is difficult for the average scholar, policy maker, or
practitioner to locate, read or digest them all. This difficulty does not
obviate the need felt by many of these potential readers to obtain a mastery of this material. Scholars of dispute resolution believe that to speak
with authority as experts, they must know the state of knowledge in the
field. Policy makers believe that in order to best address the problems
their jurisdictions experience, they must identify those reforms which
have had the greatest success. Practitioners, called on to account for the
success or failure of their programs, seek models to follow when instituting evaluations of their own. For these readers, a review article and bibliography on the topic appears to be the answer. Such an article can
abstract and summarize the essence of the important results reported by
the literature so that these readers can obtain the information they need
without having to identify, collect and review the entire literature
themselves.
This article will identify, describe, and review the existing evaluations literature on dispute resolution. However, it may not provide the
quick answers that some readers are looking for. Prior to reviewing the
literature for its results, I will review the questions which have framed
this literature and which, I argue, frame the field's interest in a literature
review of the kind suggested above. This is an important first step, for
the contribution which the empirical results of evaluations research
makes to dispute processing knowledge, depends on the questions
which the field asks of it. This article will argue that the framework of
questions predominant in dispute resolution today blinds us to some of
the significant findings of existing evaluations research and also arouses
unreasonable expectations about what such research can find in the future. In other words, our framework can divert us from thinking about
what we already know and may deceive us into believing that we know
more than we actually do. It is my hope that the reader will use this
paper not only to assess the results of existing research, but also to assess the framework through which she renders these results meaningful.
I.

WHY MUST WE EXAMINE OUR FRAMEWORKS BEFORE WE EXAMINE

OUR RESULTS

This preliminary section will explain and substantiate the importance of critically examining the frameworks through which policy makers, program implementors, program evaluators, and evaluation readers
understand processes of dispute processing. I will make four points.
First, the reporting of empirical results is framed by the conceptual perspective of the author. Second, while these frameworks facilitate our
understanding of certain aspects of dispute processing, at the same time,
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they distract our attention from other aspects of these processes. Third,
these conceptual frameworks are not specific to individual evaluators
but are shared by other evaluators, policy makers, program administrators, and additional consumers of published evaluations. Fourth, by
shaping our perceptions and expectations, these frameworks help shape
our motivations, our actions, the strategies of reform we pursue, and the
institutions we establish to achieve these reforms.'
All researchers are aware that dispute resolution programs, like all
aspects of social life, are extremely complex phenomena. In order to
describe and evaluate the success of a given program, researchers must
structure their observations, measurements, and reports to highlight a
few characteristics or variables which are, in the eyes of the researcher,
particularly significant. 2 The reviewer of the evaluations literature faces
a similar task. This body of literature presents a vast array of observations and conclusions across thousands of pages of text. In order to
summarize these findings in a concise, interesting, and useful form, the
reviewer must abstract those which are, to his eyes, the most important-the most essential.
While a framework of questions facilitates our understanding of a
particular program or body of literature by focusing our attention on
certain aspects of this complex reality, it also diverts our attention from
those aspects of the program or literature which are deemed irrelevant
by the framework's perspective. Measuring the time to disposition of a
1. The importance of interrogating the conceptual frameworks which orient sociolegal research was the central theme of the Law and Society Association's 1988 annual
meeting. Calling this theme the "Archeology of Sociolegal Studies: Constructing Questions," the program committee specified six issues for discussion:
1. How we define the legal phenomena that are studied.
2. How we determine what questions are asked. How we select propositions to
guide our research. In short, what questions are asked and what questions remain not asked or left unexamined.
3. How certain forms of data, "evidence," and arguments become persuasive in
developing the knowledge base of our field and what accounts for the sources of
influence.
4. How disciplinary orientations and/or theoretical paradigms inform and limit
our perspectives on socio-legal phenomena.
5. How explicit and implicit ideologies, values and belief systems create assumptions, biases, and silences in our research (e.g. positivism, critical theory, feminism, ethnocentrism).
6. How varied purposes (e.g. policy, evaluation, litigation, basic research) affect
the content of our research.
LAW AND SOCIETY ASSOCIATION, ARCHEOLOGY OF SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES: CONSTRUCTING

QUESTIONS (1988). This paper can be seen as an attempt to apply these questions to the
specific field of dispute processing evaluations rather than the more general field of sociolegal research per se.
2. Lind and Shapard, for example, begin their evaluation of three federal court-annexed arbitration programs by explicitly stating the aim of their research: "The primary
aim of the evaluation effort reported here was to determine whether these local rules produce the beneficial consequences anticipated without unacceptable adverse consequences.
The anticipated benefits of the rules are that they will reduce both the time and expense of
resolving certain civil cases and the burden these cases place on court resources" A. LIND
&J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS 5 (1983). In this passage Lind and Shapard are telling the reader that they have
decided to focus on the cost in time and money of processing certain civil cases. They
have used the anticipated benefits of the rules to define this focus.
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given case in an arbitration program may help systematize our knowledge concerning the speed with which this arbitration program can process cases, but this focus diverts our attention from the interactions
between disputants, counsel, and arbitrator which take place within this
time period and which actually cause the resolution of the case. 3 Consequently, the facilitation of our understanding comes at a cost. While our
framework helps us to systematize our understanding of the data which
our questions deem significant, it also diverts us from making other observations which may have as great, if not greater, significance for our
knowledge of dispute processing.
While the orienting conceptual frameworks used by individual
evaluators vary to some degree, they can not be entirely idiosyncratic.
When seeking funding for research, when conducting an evaluation, and
when writing up results, the evaluator must be concerned with the interests of her audience. For example, she must ask herself: "What is it
about this dispute resolution program that my readers are interested in
knowing?" Also, "How do I report it in a manner which is useful, comprehendible, and interesting to my readers?" If orienting frameworks
were entirely idiosyncratic, answering such questions would be impossible. However, answering questions like these is not impossible. Despite
their differences, policy makers, practitioners, and academics often
share common or related goals, interests, evaluative criteria, and perspectives. It is only because of some minimal agreement over the nature
of disputes and dispute processing that individuals from such diverse
occupations as law, social work, and social science scholarship can perceive themselves as members of a shared field. We can expect, for example, that anyone active in the dispute processing field who is reading
the results of an evaluation will immediately question the type of program being evaluated (arbitration, mediation, negotiation, and others),
the type of data examined (court records, interviews, questionnaires
with disputants, and others), and the measure of success or failure
(cheaper, faster, more equitable, and others). This sharing of outlook
constitutes, in part, the boundaries of the dispute processing field.
In establishing the importance of shared perspectives in defining
the dispute resolution field, I do not mean to suggest that behind this
minimal level of agreement there are not important differences. On the
contrary, I accept the existence of these differences but seek to explain
them as differences in conceptual perspectives rather than as differences
in the perspectives of individuals. I argue that the most important differences are not differences among particular individuals' works, but
rather between a small number of distinct and competing shared outlooks within the field. Consider, for example, differences over the
proper term for labeling our field. Is our focus of concern "dispute res3. Consider the example of Lind and Shapard discussed in the previous footnote. By
restricting their perspective to the analysis of the case costs in terms of time and expense
to the courts, the authors have purposely decided to ignore, for example, which arbitrator
techniques facilitate settlement and which do not. Id.
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olution," "alternative dispute resolution" ("ADR"), or "dispute processing?" Such debates have more at stake then semantics: they express
differences in which programs colleagues look at, differences in the criteria used in assessing program success, and'differences in what it is
hoped these programs will achieve. If we use "alternative dispute resolution," then we tend to focus on forums for dispute resolution outside
the traditional court system.4 If we use "dispute resolution" rather than
ADR, then we tend to include the processes of pre-trial negotiation and
judicial settlement which already exist in traditional institutions of adjudication. If we use "dispute processing" rather than "dispute resolution," then we tend to emphasize that the purpose or the result of the
"dispute resolution" institutions is n6t always the resolution of
5
disputes.
Conceptual frameworks provide more than descriptions of what we
find and expect to find in dispute processing programs. By framing our
experience of dispute processing, they define what we perceive to be
problematic with those processes, suggest reforms which promise to address these problems, and thereby suggest actions and institutions required to achieve these reforms. Consequently, in addition to providing
us with an orienting perspective, conceptual frameworks provide us with
strategies of policy reform and strategies for socio-legal research.
The reader should be aware that the degree and direction of causality between these various determinants of social life such as conceptual
perspectives, individual motivations, strategies of policy reform, and
others, is a subject of great debate. It is unclear, for example, whether
the modern ADR movement originated either with reform proposals by
academics suggesting that reform strategies originate with new conceptual perspectives, with court administrators experiencing an explosion
of litigation which suggests that new conceptual perspectives result from
institutional crises, with grass-roots demands for increased access tojustice which suggests that innovations in conceptual perspectives as well as
institutional reforms result from social movements, or with some other
source. Most of the disputes processing literature ascribes some determination to a combination of these causes without specifying their inter6
relationship or individual degree of determination.
In the analysis that follows, I will use a description of a prevailing
conceptual framework as my point of departure. I will then go on to
discuss the policy reforms, research agendas, institutional innovations,
actions, and impacts suggested by such an orienting framework. The
reader should not take this choice to imply that conceptual frameworks
are the sole or primary determinant of individual motivations, individual
actions, policy reform strategies, research strategies, or the creation and
persistence of institutions. Rather, it should be understood simply as
4. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976).
5. See, e.g., FeIstiner, Influences of Sodal Organizationon DisputeProcessing, 9 LAw & Soc'y
REV.

63 (1974).
6. See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DisPuTE RESOLUTION 3-5 (1985).
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my selection of one from many analytic approaches to the study of the
complex field of social phenomena called "dispute processing." The selection of this point of departure over others is defined by the objectives
of the paper: to identify, describe, and review a body of literature produced and published by this field.
II.

THE NEW FORMALISM

The evaluations literature combines a particular perspective on dispute processing with particular methods of social science research. The
New Formalism is the predominant conceptual perspective in the dispute
processing field. It provides its adherents not only with a description of
dispute processing, but also with agendas for socio-legal research and
for policy reform. Impact analysis is a type of empirical social science investigation whose assumptions and methods are particularly well suited
to New Formalism's research agenda. In this section, I will use a description of The New Formalism and of impact analysis as an analytic
approach to identify, describe, review and critique evaluations of dispute
processing as a component of a policy reform project.
A.

The New Formalist Perspective

Fuller,7 Danzig,8 and Sander9 are often cited as the intellectual origins of the modem disputes processing field. Implicit and explicit assumptions concerning the nature of disputes and disputes processing
presented in these early works have formed an orienting conceptual
in
framework that has been used and advanced by subsequent writings
10
Formalism."
New
"the
framework
this
I
call
Sarat,
After
field.
the
Lon Fuller's work establishes the possibility of a general theory of
dispute processing.1" Fuller sought to distinguish the various "orderproducing and order-restoring processes of society"' 2 on the basis of
their "distinguishing characteristics,"' 1 3 "general structure,"'1 4 or "central qualities."' 5 Fuller assumes that these central qualities determine
7. See generally Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978)
[hereinafter Fuller, Adjudication]; Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 305 (1971) [hereinafter Fuller, Mediation]; Fuller, Collective Bargaining and The Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 3 (hereinafter Fuller, Collective Bargaining].
8. Danzig, Towards the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System of CriminalJustice,
26 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1973).

9. Sander, supra note 4.
10. See Sarat, The "New Formalism" in Disputing And Dispute Processing, 21 LAw & Soc'y
REV. 695 (1988). For a similar discussion see Merry, Disputing Without Culture, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 2057 (1987). The New Formalism is not the only perspective on disputes processing
present in the current literature and Fuller, Danzig, and Sander are not its only intellectual
origins. For the origins and development of another, "non-formalist" perspective on disputes processing present in the current literature, see Abel, A ComparativeTheory of Dispute
Institutions in Society, 8 LAw & Soc'y REV. 217 (1973), and the articles found in volume 9,
issues 1 and 2, of Law and Society Review.
11. See sources cited supra note 7.
12. Fuller, Mediation, supra note 7, at 327.
13. Fuller, Adjudication, supra note 7, at 357.
14. Fuller, Mediation, supra note 7, at 309.
15. Id. at 327.
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the intrinsic limitations of the process; that is, they determine which
types of social problems the process is and is not well suited to handle.
Actually existing programs may vary in the degree to which they maintain the "integrity" of a pure process type and its ideal jurisdiction. A
particular program may mix distinguishing properties from a variety of
general process types and may be applied to social problems which it is
not well suited to address. In such cases where the "integrity" of the
general form is lost, the program outcomes will be characterized by
6
"failure" and ineffectiveness.'
Danzig demonstrates how assumptions such as Fuller's can be used
to explain the failure of governmental institutions and to recommend
policy reforms to correct these failures.' 7 Danzig questions why the existing American urban justice system fails in its efforts to control crime
through criminal adjudication. He argues that this is not the result of a
failure of adjudication per se, but rather of the application of adjudication
to too broad a range of social problems. Hence, failures in crime control can best be addressed not by replacing adjudication but by supplementing it with complementary processes of social regulation. The
proper balance of complementary processes can be identified by assuming a systems approach to society's handling of crimes and criminals.
A systems approach views the various processes which a society uses
for handling social problems as forming a system. "The systematic perspective views a change in one component of the subsystem as forcing
changes in the others."' 8 In regard to Danzig's issue of urban criminal
justice, a change in one component means changing the jurisdictional
boundaries of a given procedure. "Widening or narrowing the definition of crimes increases or decreases police, court, and correction business; changes in police techniques may overburden or free the time of
Problems with existing public institujudges and prison staffs ....
tions can thus be explained as the result of an unbalanced system: when
adjudication is applied to too wide a range of social problems, it fails to
effectively process all its cases. The resolution of these problems can be
understood as changes to the system which restore balance: introducing
decentralized community moots as a complementary component of the
criminal justice system not only improves the system's resolution of
problems which the moot takes over from traditional adjudication, but
also improves the system's resolution of those problems which remain in
adjudication's jurisdiction.
Sander accepts Fuller's. assumption concerning the possibility of a
general theory of order-restoring processes, accepts Danzig's systems
approach to the diagnosis of public policy reform, and applies these assumptions to the processing of civil disputes. 20 Like Fuller, Sander as"19

16. Fuller, Adjudication, supra note 7, at 382.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Danzig, supra note 8.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Sander, supra note 4.
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pires to develop a general theory of alternative dispute processing
programs. Like Danzig, he uses the principles of this theory to explain
the ineffectiveness of the existing system, a burdensome judicial
caseload, and to propose reforms which will produce a more effective
system, by increasing use of alternatives outside the courts. Sander goes
on, however, to argue that the principles of a general theory can be used
as "rational criteria for allocating various types of disputes to different
dispute processes." 2 1 That is, these principles are useful not only for
program designers, such as legislators, foundations, and policy intellectuals who provide funding and authorization for programs but also for
program implementors, such as administrators who run the program
22
from day to day.
Implicit in these early works of the dispute processing field are
three propositions:
1. There are a small number of essential types of procedures
for the resolution of disputes. 23 These are distinguished by
their distinctive general characteristics. These characteristics
particularly well suited to resolve
make each essential process
24
certain types of disputes.
2. Every society establishes a number of dispute processing
programs, each with its own distinctive jurisdictional boundaries. These programs form a system which functions effectively
or ineffectively depending on the type of programs it includes,
the type ofjurisdictional boundaries it defines for each, and the
which these different programs complement one
manner 2in
5
another.
3. The ineffectiveness of an existing system of dispute
processing programs can be explained and reforms which corthe general prinrect this ineffectiveness proposed by applying
26
ciples of a dispute processing theory.
21. Sander summarizes the questions he addresses as follows:
1. What are the significant characteristics of various alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (such as adjudication by courts, arbitration, mediation, negotia-

tion, and various blends of these and other devices)?
2. How can these characteristics be utilized so that, given the variety of disputes
that presently arise, we can begin to develop some rational criteria for allocating
various types of disputes to different dispute resolution processes?
Id. at 113.

22. This isthe program feature which advances Danzig's concept of a complementary
system to Sander's concept of a multi-door courthouse. To Danzig's complementary system Sander adds a gatekeeper which allocates cases according to rational criteria rather

than depending on each citizen to make the "which process" decision herself.
23. In this paper I will use "process" and "mechanism" interchangeably to refer to
essential types of dispute processing procedures. I will use "dispute processing programs" to refer to the institutionalization of a given process or mechanism in a specific
concrete organization.
24. See also M. CAPPELLETTI & B. GARTH, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1978); D. HoRowrrz,
THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLCY (1977); J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P. SZANTON, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN AMERICA (1984); Fine, Moukad & Taylor, CPR Working Taxonomy ofAlternalive Legal Processes, ALTERNATIVES, May 1983, at 9,Aug. 1983, at 4, Nov. 1983, at 5, Dec.

1983, at 5.
25. See also Abel, supra note 10; McGovern, Toward a FunctionalApproachfor Managing
Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1986).
26. See also Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of CivilJustice: Jurisdictional
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These three propositions describe the general features of disputes, dispute processing, dispute processing institutions and dispute processing
systems. They constitute "the New Formalism."
B.

The New Formalism as a Vision of the Future

As I have argued above, perspectives do more than simply frame
the descriptions we have of the world around us. By defining what does
exist, frameworks also define what should exist and can exist. They help
shape one's diagnosis of what is wrong with the present as well as one's
prescription for an improved future. Such is the case with the New Formalist perspective. The three propositions identified above include not
only a description of the present but also a vision of the future.
Proposition one makes claims about the nature of social processes.
These claims identify a field of social phenomena-dispute processingwhich operates according to certain social laws. The implication is that
researchers can construct a general theory concerning dispute processing by identifying the social laws which govern these phenomena. If social life indeed follows such laws, then researchers can use methods of
scientific investigation to construct verifiable descriptions of the properties of various types of.disputes and dispute resolution institutions, can
state these properties as principles, and can interrelate these principles
as a theory of dispute resolution.
Proposition one also suggests the form such a theory will have once
it is constructed. It suggests that a theory of dispute resolution will have
at least six variables. It assumes that there are a finite number of essential processes for the resolution of disputes (XI, X 2, Xs ....
). These
types of disputes are distinguished by a particular combination of a finite
set of process characteristics (a,, a 2, a ....
). There are also a finite
number of essential types of disputes (WI, W 2, Ws .... ). These are distinguished by a particular combination of a finite set of dispute characteristics (bl, b2, b3.... ). For each type of dispute there is one set of
outcomes which results from the application of the various general types
of processes to this particular type of dispute (Y1, Y2 , Ys .... ). These
types of outcomes are characterized by their own set of characteristics
(c1, c 2, c3 .... Y For each type of dispute, one outcome (Y) constitutes the
most effective processing of this given type of dispute. This outcome
identifies the optimum match between process type and dispute type.
Each optimum match between process type and dispute type can be
stated as a scientific principle. 27 These principles can then be interrePrinciplesfor Process Change, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 893; Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
27. In his three articles on mediation, arbitration, and adjudication, Fuller proposes a
number of principles of the type described. Consider, for example, the following statements regarding mediation:
The central quality of mediation [is] ... its capacity to reorient the parties toward
each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new
and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their
attitudes and dispositions toward one another ....
Fuller, Mediation, supra note 7, at 327.
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lated to create a general theory of dispute processing. This archetypical
theory of dispute processing is graphically represented in Chart I.
Proposition two makes claims about the nature of dispute processing institutions. These claims provide an explanation as to why some
dispute processing programs succeed while others fail. The degree to
which a given program is effective or ineffective depends on the degree
to which the program's institutional design and jurisdictional limits correspond to those laws of social action which govern dispute processing;
these laws determine the ideal "match" between process type and dispute type. Consequently, the "effectiveness" of a program is a technical
question rather than a question of value. Individuals may disagree as to
why an effective program is desired. But from the New Formalist perspective, these desired outcomes will all be achieved under the same set
of conditions. When the design of an actual program (in terms of the
technique applied and the jurisdiction of cases it is applied to) corresponds to the social laws governing dispute processing, all desirable
program outcomes or impacts will be achieved simultaneously.
A program's "effectiveness" should be distinguished from its "efficiency." "Efficiency" is usually interpreted as meaning the achievement
of a desired outcome with a minimum of time, effort, or 5 xpense. Many
reformers are interested in a general theory of dispute processing because they are interested in instituting an "efficient" dispute processing
system-that is, one which minimizes the cost and time required to process disputes. Within the New Formalist perspective, the most "efficient" dispute processing system is the system which has the most
"effective" design-that is, the system whose existing programs and jurisdictions correspond to the principles of the general theory of dispute
28
processing.
Proposition two not only assumes the possibility of an effective dispute processing system but also suggests how the design for such a system can be obtained: namely, through social science research. If
dispute processing mechanisms are things with stable attributes, capacities, and limits which are ideally suited for resolving certain types of disputes with stable attributes of their own, then the world is such that
human beings can identify a rational ground for defining and orienting
enlightened social policy regarding disputes processing. Scientific
Mediation is itself subject to intrinsic limitations; I have discussed two of these:
(1) it cannot generally be employed when more than two parties are involved; (2)
it presupposes an intermeshing of interests of an intensity sufficient to make the
parties willing to collaborate in the mediational effort
Id. at 330. In these sentences, Fuller defines the pure mechanism type "mediation" using
its distinctive characteristic features. He defines two general characteristic features of disputes, and he identifies disputes which have these characteristics as those which mediation
is most ideally suited to process.
28. Reformers can disagree as to whether the outcomes desired and the measures
used should be limited to questions of efficiency (some reformers may wish to include other
outcomes such as increased access to justice, increased quality ofjustice, and others). But
they can disagree regarding desired outcomes and measures while agreeing that their various outcomes will be achieved under the same conditions: when the system is designed
effectively.
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CHART I
Outline for a General Theory of Dispute Processing
as Defined by the New Formalist Perspective
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Where:
Xk
Wk

= a, + a2 + a + a 4 + ...ak
= b1 + b2 + b3 + b 4 + ...bk
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And Where:
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= Type of Mechanism
= Type of Dispute

= Type of Outcome
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= Dispute Characteristics
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knowledge of the laws of social behavior which define the most effective
fit between types of disputes and types of dispute processing institutions
can provide policy makers and implementors with rational guidance in
designing, employing, assessing, and adjusting the legal system so that it
most effectively achieves its goals and functions. In short, the design for
an effective system can be found in the general theory of dispute
processing.
Proposition three makes claims regarding the responsibilities of
policy makers, practitioners, and researchers and the use they must
make of a general theory of dispute processing in executing these responsibilities. Implicit in these claims is a vision of the proper division
of labor between these three vocations in a society which implements
New Formalism's enlightened dispute processing policy. In such a society researchers are charged with identifying the properties of various types
of dispute resolution institutions, with stating these properties as principles, and with interrelating them as a theory of dispute resolution. Policy
makers use this knowledge to guide their construction of a balanced system of dispute resolution institutions. The theory tells them what type
of mechanisms are best suited to process different types of disputes. It
is then their job to make sure that each type of mechanism is available
and accessible in the society. Professionalpractitionerslocate and implement these programs so that they operate in the most effective manner.
A theory of dispute resolution can help them in this responsibility in two
ways. First, this knowledge can provide practitioners with rational criteria for assigning disputes to the most effective arena for their resolution.
Second, this knowledge can provide practitioners with standards by
which they can assure, through periodic evaluations, that operation of
their programs optimize the efficiency and quality of their output.
Should the institution fall short, these principles can be guides to adjust
the institution.
C.

The New Formalism as a Social Project

While writers such as Fuller, Danzig, and Sander anticipate a general theory of dispute resolution and a rational dispute processing sys29
tem, they do not propose that these are already completed projects.
While they assume that disputes and dispute processing follow social
laws, they do not pretend that human beings have as yet specified these
laws as principles of knowledge. They think that a balanced, effective
system of dispute processing institutions is possible, but they do not assume that such mechanisms have actually been established, or, if instituted, have been applied to those types of disputes for which they are
most ideally suited.
29. "Nothing said in this Article," writes Danzig, "should be taken to mean that the
time for looking has passed and that we are ready to leap. Though advanced with enthusiasm, recommendations based on so rudimentary a collection of observations as those
presented here should be tested in practice (and doubtless modified) before it can be decided whether and how they should be put into effect on a large scale. This Article should
be read only as a blueprint for experimentation." Danzig, supra note 8, at 12-13.
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However, by juxtaposing the description of a flawed present and a
perfect future, New Formalist assumptions can provide incentives to
make its vision of the future a reality. If social scientists define their
vocation as the accumulation of general knowledge, they will interpret
the definition of a new field of phenomena as both an opportunity and
demand for new research. If policy makers see it as their duty to fulfill
social needs in the most effective manner possible, they will interpret the
promise of a more effective dispute processing system as a call to action.
If practitioners are charged with administering their programs as successfully as possible and with substantiating that success, they will find
appealing the promise of a set of guidelines which insure effective program operation.
If social actors aspire to achieve New Formalism's aspirations then
they adopt the framework's vision of the future as their goals for the
present. Through this process, the framework's assumptions can shape
the direction and style of social action. Researchers who adopt the New
Formalist perspective will use it to define their research goals: to construct a general theory modeled on the archetype illustrated in Chart I.
Policy makers will use it to define their policy objectives: to construct a
balanced and effective system of dispute processing institutions by organizing new programs and by adjusting those that already exist. Practitioners will use its principles to fine-tune the operation of their
programs: to maximize the effectiveness of their program by insuring
that the program applies the right set of procedures.
Undertaking the realization of New Formalism's vision of the future
as a social project raises questions of strategy and method. If such a theory
is possible and its construction is accepted as a goal, by what method
should one construct such a theory? Should it be deduced from principles or should it be induced from empirical experience? If an enlightened system of institutions can be designed using a general theory and
fabrication of such system accepted as a social project, what strategy
should be followed in constructing its institutions? Should the general
theory be completed before designing and implementing programs? Or
should the development of theory and the development of programs be
concurrent enterprises?
While some New Formalists have relied on methods of deduction, 0
most argue that a verified theory can only be developed using a method
of empirical observation and experimentation. "[T]he system presented
here," writes Danzig, "is designed to move from existing knowledge,
empirically derived, to a scheme of larger, more coordinated experiments, and then ultimately, to a higher level of implementation." '
Sander concurs:
30. See, e.g., D. LUBAN, THE QUALITY OFJUSTICE (1987); D. WATERMAN & M. PETERSON,
MODELS OF LEGAL DECISIONMAKING: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS (1981); Bush, supra
note 26; Fuller, Adjudication, supra note 7; Fuller, Mediation, supra note 7; Fuller, Collective
Bargaining,supra note 7; Priest & Klien, supra note 26.
31. Danzig, supra note 8, at 13.
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[T]here is so much we do not know. Among other things, we
need better data than are presently available in many states on
what is in fact going on in the courts so that we can develop
some sophisticated notion of where the main trouble spots are
and what types of cases are prime candidates for alternative resolution. We need more evaluation of the comparative efficacy
and cost of different dispute resolution mechanisms. And we
need more data on the role played by some of the key individuals in the process (e.g., lawyers) ....32
Adopting a method of empirical research has important consequences for the strategy pursued. Researchers cannot obtain the data
they require without observing existing institutions. Since a variety of
dispute resolution mechanisms have not been tried in practice, researchers are dependent on policy makers to institute untested experimental
mechanisms. 3 3 Therefore, the selection of a method of empirical observation and experimentation requires a strategy which develops a general
theory and a reformed system of dispute processing institutions
concurrently.
This method and strategy requires the cooperation of policy makers, practitioners, and researchers. Since a complete and verified general theory does not yet exist, all three classes of actors pursue their
projects with imperfect information. Policy makers must experiment
with new or untried types of dispute processing mechanisms. When implementing these programs, practitioners must select among a range of
unproved criteria to use for sorting cases and for evaluating program
success. Researchers must use hypothetical typologies of mechanisms
and dispute types when constructing, conducting, and interpreting
experiments.
Given imperfect knowledge, all three classes of actors can facilitate
their respective goals through cooperation and the exchange of information. Researchers cannot obtain the data they require to either induce
general propositions or to test the validity of these propositions without
observing existing institutions. Policy makers cannot design new institutional forms that promise improved dispute processing without theoretical suggestions from researchers or descriptions of what has already
been tried by existing programs. Practitioners can neither assess the
success of programs nor justify their continued funding without standards, measures, and methods of success provided by researchers.
In summary, if the New Formalist perspective is correct, if a
grounded theory of dispute processing does not yet exist, and if a
method of empirical experimentation and a strategy of concurrent development are the proper means to achieve an enlightened future, then
policy makers, practitioners, and researchers must unite in a common
project of evaluation. An evaluation is "an internal effort to define and
32. Sander, supra note 4, at 133.
33. Such programs are often "experiments" not only in the sense that they are new,
but also in the sense that they are programs with limited jurisdiction for a provisional
period of time.

1989]

EVALUATIONS OF DISPUTE PROCESSING

improve operations over time while providing descriptive information to
the field." 3 4 It combines the "internal" interests of policy makers and
practitioners to assess and improve the success of their particular program with the "external" interest of researchers to construct scientific
knowledge which is of general use to all programs.
D. Impact Analysis
Researchers who see the world in New Formalist terms can use evaluations to construct an empirically-grounded theory of dispute processing.3 5 With the implementation of each new type of mechanism X , with
jurisdiction for dispute type W1 , social scientists can observe the outcome Y, which this configuration produces. Once a sufficient number of
experimental programs (Xk + Wk) have yielded a sufficient number of
outcomes (Yk), then the cross-comparison of these results should manifest discernable patterns of effective combinations of program type and
dispute type.
This method requires periodic literature reviews of the existing
body of evaluations. 3 6 These reviews summarize the data required for
such a cross-comparison. The review identifies those evaluations that
have been conducted, summarizes the type of programs that have been
tried (XI + W 1), and reports the outcomes (YI) that have resulted from
each program. These data can then be arranged according to the archetype in Chart I. Given sufficient data, such a chart should manifest those
combinations of mechanism type and dispute type which yield the best
results. These patterns of effective combinations represent a first approximation of the principals of a general theory.
However, in order for this research strategy to succeed, the data
must be collected in a manner which insures its validity and be
presented in a form which allows for cross-comparison. New Formalist
assumptions do not specify how these conditions of validity and comparability can be achieved. While there are a number of social science
methods available which claim to produce valid and,,comparable results,
the method of choice in dispute processing evaluations has tended to be
37
"impact analysis."
34. Comment byJanis Roehl at a workshop on Identifying and Measuring the Quality
of Dispute Resolution Processes and Outcomes, held at the University of WisconsinMadison Law School. (July 14, 1987) (quoted by Christine Harrington).
35. In this paper I use the terms "researchers," "sociologists of law," and "socio-legal
scholars" interchangeably. I will also use the term "social scientists." Unless otherwise
specified, when I use the term "social scientists" I mean to imply social scientists involved
in the study of dispute processing.
36. "Above all . . . we need to accumulate and disseminate the presently available
learning concerning promising alternative resolution mechanisms, and encourage continued experimentation and research." Sander, supra note 4, at 133.
37. For an explicit prescription for the use of impact analyses in dispute processing,
see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADvIsORY COMMITrEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW,
EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT OF THE FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COM-

MITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAw (1981). The disputes processing literature uses
social science methods other than impact analysis to insure the validity and comparability
of measured outcomes. For the use of social psychological methods of experimentation
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Impact analysis is a social science method whose assumptions are
particularly compatible with the assumptions of the New Formalism.
The objective of the New Formalist research strategy outlined above is
to empirically assess the effectiveness with which a particular dispute
program processes the particular disputes in its jurisdiction. Impact
analysis is a set of procedures for assessing the impact of a set of activities on a set of objects in a manner which is comparable and valid. It
insures the comparability of data by compiling it in a quantitative form.
It insures the validity of the data by using collection procedures that are
open to logical substantiation.
Larry Mohr has recently completed a formal presentation of impact
analysis:
Let us take the term impact analysis to mean determining the extent to which one set of directed human activities (X) affected
the state of some objects or phenomena (Y ... ) and-at least
sometimes-determining why the effects were as small or large
as they turned out to be. We usually think of X as being some
established program and each Y as being one of the many possible outcomes of the program .... 38
According to Mohr, every impact analysis has, implicitly or explicitly, a
program theory. The theory predicts that a particular problem will be
resolved by applying a particular treatment to a set of objects. It is expected that this treatment will result, by way of a set of intermediate
causal links, in an outcome which remedies or improves the problem.
The purpose of the impact analysis is to construct a measure which
assesses the degree to which the actual outcome of the treatment improves or fails to improve the problem at hand over the situation that
would have resulted had the treatment not been applied. This measure
thus tests whether the theory of treatment outcome is correct. Sometimes the impact analysis also includes measures of intervening causal
conditions in order to substantiate the expected causal mechanism as
well as the expected outcomes. These measures can test whether the
explanation given by the theory of outcome is correct. Therefore, Mohr
asserts that all impact studies have three major components:
1. The theory has component elements; impact analysis consists
largely of making observations about these elements and relatsee Thibaut & Holden, Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and Non-Adversary
Proceedings, 71 MIcH. L. REV. 1129 (1973); Thibaut, Walker, LaTour & Holden, Procedural
Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (1974); Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmahing, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972). For the use of general
random surveys, see W. BRAZIL, SETrLING CIVIL DISPUTES (1985) (judicial settlement); D.
KING & K. McEvoy, NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE COMPLAINT-HANDLING PROCEDURES USED By CONSUMERS (1976); Brazil, ImprovingJudicialControlsover the PretrialDevelopment of CivilActions: Model
Rulesfor Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 873 (1981); Brazil, Views
From The Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the Civil Discovery System, 1980 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 217 (1980); Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787 (1980); Special Issue on Dispute Processingand Civil Litigation, 15
LAw & Soc'y REV. 391 (1980-81).
38. L. MOHR, IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR PROGRAM EVALUATION 1 (1988).
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ing them to one another. The primary elements are the problem, the activities, the outcome of interest (sometimes called
the objective) and the subobjectives ....
2. There must be some means for determining whether the
theory is correct. Whatever means one uses can be called the
design.
3. There must be a way of quantifying the program's effectiveness.

This is accomplished through statistics

. . .9

In both impact analysis and the New Formalism, the goal of research is to assess the extent to which a program impacts on a set of
objects. In the New Formalist study of dispute processing, an existing
suboptimal match between a dispute processing mechanism and dispute

type is the problem and counterfactual,' the experimental dispute
processing program is the treatment, the disputes that fall within the
jurisdiction of the program are the objects to which the treatment is applied, and the improved performance of the program in processing the
dispute is the desired outcome.
Lind and Shapard's evaluation of court-annexed arbitration in three
federal district courts is a good example of the use of impact analysis in
the evaluation of dispute processing programs. 40 Consider the following passages from this evaluation:
The anticipated benefits of the rules are that they will reduce
both the time and expense of resolving certain civil cases and
the burden these cases place on court resources .... 41 We can
suggest two potential functions of court-annexed arbitration
and consider the consequences ...

that these functions might

produce. The first potential function of the rules is that they
compel subject cases to obtain an advisory verdict through an
informal, trial-like proceeding. This advisory verdict might resolve the case prior to trial, either by being accepted by the
parties or by serving as the basis of a post-hearing settlement.
The second potential function of the rules is that they set a time
limit on preparing the case for the arbitration hearing, by requiring that the hearing be held within about seven months
from the time the case is filed .... 42 A prompt time schedule
for the arbitration hearing provides a motivation for counsel to
prepare their cases promptly, and the expense of attorney time
spent in the arbitration hearing may motivate settlement in advance of the hearing. If the case goes to arbitration, the hearing itself may provide an excellent basis for assessing the
strengths and weaknesses of the case, and the arbitrator's
award may be regarded as a reliable estimate of the likely verdict at trial; both sorts of information may provide a sound
foundation for negotiated settlement. This may lead to acceptance of the arbitration award, or to settlement soon after the
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 2.
A. LIND &J.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 8.

SHAPARD,

supra note 2.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:3

award is issued. 4 3
The most obvious way in which the arbitration rules may
reduce the time from filing to termination of subject cases is if
all, or nearly all, cases reaching an arbitration hearing were terminated by acceptance of the arbitration award and if a substanin less time
tial number of cases reached an arbitration hearing
44
than it would normally take to resolve them.
If the rules provide a realistic and prompt time frame for
the preparation of cases, or if the arbitration hearings produce
reliable judgments of case value, then there is reason to hope
that the rules will expedite settlement. The evaluation attempts to determine the effects of the rules on time from filing
to termination by two methods: (a) direct comparison of the
duration of arbitration cases with an estimate of what the duration would have been in the absence of the rule, and a survey of
attorney 45perceptions of the effects of the rule on case
duration.
In this program theory, the problem is "the burden" which civil cases
put on the courts. The treatment is (1) compulsion to attend an arbitration hearing and (2) a limit on the time period within which the hearing
must take place. These treatments are applied to the objects "federal personal injury or contract cases involving damages of not more than
$100,000." The ultimate outcome is to reduce the burden which civil cases
place on the courts. The outcome of interest is to have nearly all arbitrated
cases end with an arbitrated award reached in less time than a fully adjudicated trial. The counterfactual is the time and expense of resolving a
civil case in the absence of arbitration and its time limits. The subobjectives include (1) early settlement, resulting from (2) an early framework
for settlement, (3) acceptance of an early advisory verdict, or (4) parties
experiencing the cost of attorneys time earlier in the process due to (5)
attorneys preparing their cases earlier in the process. There are two
quantitative measures. First, a measure of the average duration of arbitrated and non-arbitrated cases is used to assess the outcome of interest.
Second, a measure of attorney perception regarding whether arbitration
contributed to early settlement is used to assess the theory's explanation
of why the outcome of interest occurred.
E.

The New Formalism as Ideal Type

The reader should not expect to find the New Formalist perspective
present in published evaluations with the conceptual purity of the description above. It will not be found in its totality within the head of any
concrete individual or in the argument of any written evaluation. However, the reader will find elements of this perspective in most of the dispute processing literature. These New Formalist elements will be found
mixed in with elements from other perspectives on dispute process43. Id. at 10.
44. Id. at 8-9.
45. Id. at 11-12.
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ing.46 In other words, my description of "the New Formalist perspec47
tive" should be understood as an ideal type.
If the New Formalism is a sometimes present and sometimes absent
set of assumptions, then it is instructive to consider at what times it is
present and at what times it is absent in the body of published evaluations. My presentation above suggests that New Formalist assumptions
define a project for knowledge, provide a set of procedures through
which this knowledge should be pursued, provide a set of orienting concepts to be used in presenting the results of these procedures, and explain how the results from one evaluation should combine with the
results of other evaluations to construct general knowledge regarding
dispute processing. In short, these assumptions promise that if experience is digested in a particular form in the present, it will yield a definitive type of result in the future. Specifically, it will yield an empiricallygrounded theory of dispute processing that can be used as a rational
ground for enlightened policy-making.
Therefore, New Formalist assumptions most frequently appear in
the disputes processing literature at those moments when the author
needs some guidance as to which experiences will prove to be significant
and as to how such experiences can be reported so as to have an impact
on future work. Thus, the real impact of the New Formalist perspective
can be found in the promises it makes. These promises impact on social
action by motivating and shaping current perceptions. It encourages
policy makers, practitioners, and evaluators to accord significance to
certain of their experiences of experimental programs and to ignore
others as insignificant. New Formalism influences the experiences that
evaluators report, the manner in which these experiences are patterned,
and the form in which they are presented as published evaluations. Further, these anticipations of the future explain to those who read and
review published evaluations how to cross-compare and synthesize them
into a body of knowledge. When one constructs or reads a literature
review, New Formalist assumptions lead one to see certain results in cer46. See, e.g., C. HARRINGTON, SHADOWJUSTICE (1985); Abel, The Contradictionsof InformalJustice, in THE POLITxCS OF INFORMALJUSTICE 267 (1982); Dezalay, NegotiatedJustice as
Renegotiation of the Division of Tasks Within the Field of Law: The French Example,
(June 15, 1987) (paper presented at the Conference on Dispute Resolution Research in
Europe, Washington, D.C.); Dezalay, 'The Forum Should Fit The Fuss.. .': The Economics and Politics of Negotiated Justice: A Historical Approach (December 4, 1987) (paper
presented to the Amherst Seminar, Amherst, Mass.); Mather & Yngvesson, Language,Audience, and the Transformation of Disputes, 15 LAW & Soc'v REv. 775 (1980-8 1); Yngvesson, Reexamining Continuing Relations and the Law, 1985 Wis L. REv. 623.
47. According to Weber, an ideal type:
•.. is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by
the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those
one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in
reality ....
Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual
case, the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from
reality ....
WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 90 (1949) (emphasis added).
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tain forms as significant and open to cross-comparison and to see other
results as idiosyncratic and insignificant.
III.

A NEW FORMALIST LITERATURE REVIEW: WE Do NOT KNOW
WHAT WE THINK

In this section, I will assess New Formalism's claims by constructing
a review of the results collected from the research projects it has inspired. New Formalist assumptions propose that the most crucial features of an experimental program are the type of mechanism used, the
type of dispute to which it is applied, and a measure of the success of the
outcome this match generates. They promise that if this essential information is extracted from a sufficient number of experiments (evaluations), the pattern of results should reveal matches which achieve
optimal results. Organizing the experimental results in this form should
yield a general theory of dispute processing.
In the following pages, I will attempt to organize actual results from
published impact studies in this manner. As the Appendix demonstrates, there are now a number of impact studies of dispute processing
programs that have been completed and reported. If the premises and
promises of the New Formalism are correct, then it should be possible to
use these premises to organize published impact study results. If there
are a sufficient number of results, organizing these results in the form of
Chart I should reveal which combinations of mechanism and dispute
type are effective and which are ineffective. The specification of effective
combinations will constitute the postulates of a general theory.
This exercise will critically assess the New Formalist research project in three ways. First, it will assess the extent to which this research
project is complete. By organizing the results reported in the form dictated by New Formalism's premises, I will show the extent to which the
universe of process types, dispute types, and process/dispute matches
have been tried.
Second, this exercise will make manifest some of the difficulties involved in completing the New Formalist project. The New Formalism
makes certain promises about what its research project will yield at its
completion. However, it does not identify the difficulties encountered
in getting there nor does it give instruction on how to overcome these
difficulties. In constructing a New Formalist review of impact study results, I will come across a number of the difficulties which must be addressed before the New Formalist project can be completed. As will be
seen, overcoming these difficulties often requires making certain assumptions. If these assumptions are unacceptable, then completing the
New Formalist research project becomes difficult.
Finally, this exercise will test the veracity of New Formalism's premises. As visions or promises of the future which orient our understanding, perspectives such as the New Formalism are rarely tested.
However, since New Formalism's premises make certain predictions
about patterns which should emerge in empirical results, we can test the
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veracity of these premises by seeing whether the pattern of outcomes
they predict in fact occur in published results. In using New Formalist
assumptions to organize the existing knowledge in the field of dispute
processing evaluations, I am simultaneously "testing" the predictive
power of these assumptions.
For this exercise, I will assume that New Formalism's premises are
correct descriptions of the laws of social action. My purpose in this section is not to criticize these premises outright, but to examine the difficulties one encounters if one assumes that these premises are correct
and attempts to follow through on their promises. I am also assuming
the results reported by impact studies to be "facts." That is, I assume
that the outcomes reported are accurate descriptions of the outcomes
which "actually" occur. This means, first, that there have been no errors
in measuring or reporting the outcomes and, second, that the measurement of outcomes is not subject to the particular perspective or biases of
the evaluator. It is assumed that any evaluator who replicates these impact studies using acceptable scientific procedures would obtain the
same results. In Section IV below I will once again relax these
assumptions.
A.

The Extent of the Existing Data
In order to organize impact study results in the manner called for

by New Formalist assumptions and illustrated in Chart I, I must specify a
typology of dispute resolution mechanisms (Xk), a typology of disputes
(Wk), and a set of comparable measures (ck) of program outcomes (Yk).
New Formalist assumptions presume that the correct typologies and
measures are already defined by the laws of social action. Unfortunately, the dispute processing field has yet to ascertain these "true" taxonomies and measures. Consequently, evaluations of dispute
processing programs must be used not only for measuring outcomes,
but also for inferring typologies or for confirming theoretically-hypothesized typologies.
This lack of knowledge regarding proper typologies and measures
creates an unfortunate indeterminacy in the proper interpretation of
evaluation results. Assuming the principles of New Formalism are true,
a more effective outcome indicates one or both of the following. First, a
more effective outcome indicates that the mechanism or dispute jurisdiction being evaluated more closely approximates the characteristics of a
pure type then those programs which yield less effective results. In this
case, the program is effective because it maintains the integrity of the
pure process or dispute type. In other words, the effective outcome indicates that in designing the program, the administrator has "happened" to apply the true typology of mechanisms or the true typology of
disputes as defined by the, as yet unknown, laws of social action.
Second, a more effective outcome indicates that the correlation of
mechanism and dispute type provided by the program approximates
more closely an ideal match of mechanism and dispute type than those
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with less effective results. In this case, the program is effective because
the program has applied a mechanism to its appropriate subject; the
program conforms to the laws of social action which govern dispute
processing.
Therefore, charting these outcomes tests two elements of existing
knowledge simultaneously: the accuracy of the taxonomies and the effectiveness of the different correlations they define. 48 While this simultaneity is not desirable from the standpoint of scientific research design,
it is unavoidable because in practice it is impossible to separate these
effects.
Given that the "true" taxonomies are not known, which available
approximations should be used in charting impact study results? There
are two possibilities: the best taxonomy currently developed by dispute
processing theorists or a compilation of the types actually used by the
programs evaluated.
Mechanism Types

(Xk)

It would seem that comparison of tested outcomes requires using a
typology constructed from the mechanisms and jurisdictions actually
tested. Unfortunately, a review of the existing evaluations literature
reveals a wide variety of program types. Arbitration, for example, may
be court-annexed or independent of the court, may have mandatory participation or be voluntary, may sanction or not sanction parties for refusing to accept the arbitrated award, may or may not have a time limit
within which the hearing takes place, and so on. If programs that differ
in institutional features such as these are treated as distinct types of
mechanisms, then the catalogue of mechanism types quickly multiplies
to a large number of types with one entry each.
However, if the premises of the New Formalism are taken seriously,
then mechanism categories need not be multiplied in this manner.
These premises suggest that dispute processing techniques can be classified into separate and distinct types by identifying the essential characteristics of the program. While individual arbitration programs may
vary in some of their institutional features, all arbitration programs
should share certain important and essential features. And it is these
features which make this type of mechanism well suited to address particular classes of disputes. Therefore, one can utilize a theoretically-derived taxonomy of mechanism types where types are distinguished by
important differences in their essential characteristics if the programs
reported lend themselves to re-classification within such categories.
48. If I knew and used the "true" taxonomies, then-charting the outcomes would only
test the optimal correlations between their categories. However, since we do not yet have
a verified general theory of these social laws, I must use approximations to the "actual"
taxonomies. It is remotely possible that I am in fact using the "true" categories and do
not know it. But since I cannot be sure, I must assume that I am using the outcomes
reported by actual impact studies to test both the accuracy of the taxonomy and the efficiency of the correlation simultaneously.
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In the introduction to their casebook on dispute processing,
Goldberg, Green and Sander 49 identify four types of mechanisms (adjudication, arbitration, mediation, negotiation) and five "hybrids" (private
judging, neutral expert fact finding, mini-trial, ombudsman, summary
jury trial) on the basis of seven characteristics (voluntariness of the proceeding, binding nature of the agreement, presence and responsibilities
of the third party, degree of formality of the proceeding, nature of the
proceeding, and whether the proceeding is public or private). This definition of nine mechanism types (Xk) based on seven essential characteristics (ak) is reproduced in Table I. While the programs evaluated by
impact studies vary widely in design, most are labeled or characterized
by the program evaluators as one of these nine mechanism types. Thus,
in choosing a taxonomy of mechanisms, the two sources of such a taxonomy (theoretically-defined or practically-defined) appear compatible.
Dispute Types (Wk)
It is more difficult to select a taxonomy of dispute types. One reason for this difficulty is the lack of any concrete proposals for such a
taxonomy by theorists in the field. Once again Goldberg, Green and
Sander provide the best lead. While they do not propose specific categories of disputes (Wk), they do identify six characteristics for distinguishing disputes by type (bk):
1. The relationship between the disputants (whether it is
ongoing or not).
2. The nature of the dispute (whether it is polycentric,
whether it involves a novel legal issue, etc.).
3. The amount at stake.
4. The speed of processing the dispute.
5. The cost of processing the dispute.
6. The power relationship between the parties (whether one
disputant has significantly less bargaining strength).50
If researchers have been slow in constructing a taxonomy of dispute
types, policy makers have been even slower in experimenting with a
wide range of theoretically-significant dispute types. A review of existing impact studies reveals that evaluated programs draw theirjurisdictional boundaries in two general ways. The most common characteristic
for drawing jurisdictional boundaries is the jurisdictional boundary of a
court ("criminal cases," "civil cases," or "minor civil cases") usually further restricted by a limit as to the amount at stake. Other programs
define their jurisdictions according to the subject under dispute. Some
of these subjects are defined using legal categories such as "medical
malpractice" while others use non-legal categories such as "neighborhood disputes," "consumer disputes," or "employment disputes."
Many evaluations specify categories within the program's broadjurisdic49. S.

GOLDBERG,

50. Id. at 10.

E.

GREEN,

& F.

SANDER, supra note

6, at 7-10.
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tions, but few measure program outcomes separately for each of these
subdivisions.
Therefore, there is an unfortunate incompatibility between a theoretically-significant taxonomy of dispute jurisdictions ("dispute types")
and the taxonomy of actually-existing jurisdictions. Jurisdictions actually used in evaluated programs are self-defined using only one of
Goldberg, Green, and Sander's six dispute characteristics ("amount at
stake"), and it is difficult if not impossible for the reviewer to code evaluated programs using their other five characteristics. Since I must depend on actually existing programs as the source of my data, I must use
the jurisdictional limits defined by the authorizing rules of the programs
to construct my typology of disputes. 5 1
Mapping Combinations Tested
Using the single typology of mechanism types and the two typologies of dispute types, I have constructed two specifications of Chart I. In
Chart II I have coded existing impact studies which define their dispute
jurisdiction by court and case value. In Chart III I have coded existing
impact studies which define their dispute jurisdiction by the substantive
nature of the case. In both charts the type of mechanism is defined using Goldberg, Green, and Sander's nine-fold typology. Charts II and III
illustrate those combinations of mechanism type and dispute type that
have been tested and "scientifically" measured by existing evaluations.
In other words, they illustrate the extent of the data presently available
to the field.
These charts demonstrate that existing impact studies do not provide the field with sufficient data to construct a general theory of dispute
processing as envisioned by the New Formalist perspective. At the present time, there has not been sufficient experimentation with either
mechanism types or dispute types. Only two mechanisms have been the
subject of more than a handful of impact studies: mediation and arbitration. Arbitration has been experimented with exclusively in civil cases.
The types of cases to which arbitration has been applied have been limited mainly to those defined in terms of one general dispute characteristic: amount at stake (although this single dispute characteristic has been
specified at varying amount limits). Mediation has been applied to both
civil and criminal cases. In some programs, it has been applied to a single type of substantively-defined case. These studies of mediation and
51. The difficulty of integrating a taxonomy of dispute types based on jurisdictions
actually used with a taxonomy based on theoretically-defined case characteristics is a major
obstacle in New Formalism's research strategy. The New Formalism suggests that there
are essential types of mechanisms and disputes, and that it is possible to know what these
essential types are. Evaluations and literature reviews of evaluations are often written as if
each new evaluation brings us one step closer to revealing the character of these essential
types. But if the definition ofjurisdictional limits using valuation, severity, or substantive
legal types is an incorrect strategy for specifying the essential types of disputes, then the
New Formalist research project is in trouble: for there is no promise that in the future
experimental programs will test jurisdictions drawn using theoretically-identified case
characteristics.
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arbitration provide the best hope for using empirical data to make general distinctions between dispute types on the basis of dispute characteristics. There is insufficient data regarding the other seven mechanism
types to draw general distinctions.
B.

Measuring Outcome: Problems of Validity and Comparability

While Charts II and III illustrate the combinations of dispute and
mechanism type for which impact studies exist, they do not actually report the results of these studies. In order to construct a general theory
of dispute processing, one must report the outcomes determined by impact studies in a manner which permits cross-comparison of results.
Only by measuring the effectiveness of each outcome and comparing it
with the outcomes of other studies can one discern patterns of effectiveness and ineffectiveness across different combinations of mechanism
and dispute type.
The New Formalism defines increased effectiveness of dispute
processing as the ultimate outcome desired from experimental programs. New Formalism's archetypical general theory (summarized in
Chart I) presumes that this outcome can be measured directly (as Yk). If
this can be done, then patterns of effectiveness across different combinations of mechanism and dispute type can be observed.
Unfortunately, effectiveness cannot be measured directly. In fact, it
is difficult to imagine what an "effective" outcome would look like, much
less how it could be measured. In practice, evaluators must always operationalize this ultimate outcome as a number of more specific outcomes
of interest. A review of the existing evaluations literature shows some
agreement on seven outcomes of interest. An effective dispute processing program will minimize the cost of processing disputes, minimize the time
it takes to process a dispute, maximize the permanence of the resolution obtained, provide a dispute resolution process which is morefair, provide
greaterparty satisfaction in the process, process disputes in a more equitable manner, and will insure that dispute processing and the resolutions it
produces contribute to the strengthening of community.52 These outcomes
of interest may be thought of as the "general characteristics of outcomes" expressed as "ck" in Chart I. These general characteristics con' 53
stitute the ultimate outcome "effective system operation."
While the operationalization of program effectiveness (Yk) as seven
outcomes (ck) of interest gets us closer to a practical measure of effectiveness, it does not guarantee that different impact studies will use the
same measures. Does this invalidate any cross-comparison of results?
The comparability of outcomes raises a number of issues. First, are
52. For a more complete discussion of these outcomes, see Bush, supra note 26, and
Merry, supra note 10.
53. The presumption is that the counterfactual-the existing system of dispute
processing institutions-does not minimize cost, speed ofprocessing, permanence of resolution, fairness, equity, or strength of community because it is not designed to process
each type of dispute using the type of mechanism most ideally suited to address it.
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the various impact studies being compared testing the same outcomes of
interest? Second, does the research design of each evaluation insure
equal validity of results? Third, are the outcomes assessed using measures which are either the same or comparable? The three major components of impact analysis-program theory, research design, and
quantitative measures of assessment-are each designed to address
these three issues within a particular program evaluation. In constructing a review of various program results, one must address these same
three issues as they apply to the cross-comparison of impact studies.
The Program Theory
In order to insure comparability, the various evaluations must be
examined to insure that they share common or compatible program theories. I have demonstrated that program theories include a problem, a
treatment (the program), an ultimate outcome (effectiveness) which is
not measured, and various outcomes of interest (the objectives) which
are measured. The New Formalist program for knowledge does not require that all problems, treatments, or outcomes be the same; it does
require that all problems, treatments, or outcomes be subject to classification using a consistent typology of problems, treatments, and outcomes. I have established such a consistent set of typologies in the
discussion above. The typology of problems is the typology of disputes
(Wk); the typology of treatments is the typology of disputes processing
mechanisms (Xk); and the typology of outcomes is the various measures
of program effectiveness (Yk).
Research Design
The degree to which one can place stock in the validity of particular
program results depends on the validity of the procedures followed in
executing the program and in collecting the data. The issue here is not
whether each program uses the same set of procedures, but whether the
procedures followed are equally valid. Different procedures can yield
equally valid results. Further, differences in the validity of results are
not necessarily barriers to the comparability of results. While variations
in validity across results adds to the uncertainty of the overall pattern in
effectiveness, it does not prevent the comparison of individual outcomes. Consequently, this problem is similar to the problem of specifying the types of mechanisms and the types of disputes: it adds to the
uncertainty of overall results, but it does not bar one from constructing
some provisional findings.
Quantified Measures
Given the specification of seven outcomes of interest, evaluation results should be compared using these outcomes. Ideally, each impact
study would assess all seven outcomes of interest using a standardized
quantitative measure for each outcome. The seven standardized meas-
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ures for each outcome of interest would then be combined into a single
measure of the program's overall effectiveness.
The operationalization of "effectiveness" into outcomes of interest
coupled with the small number of typical data sources available to an
evaluator produces the appearance that these seven objectives of interest can themselves be measured directly. For example, it would seem a
rather straightforward exercise to measure the time savings of using a
more appropriate dispute processing mechanism. Since almost all programs record the date of case filing and the date a case is resolved, average case disposition time would appear to be a relatively easy measure to
54
obtain.
In fact, it is more difficult then it appears to obtain measures of
these seven outcomes which are directly comparable. Each outcome of
interest is mixed with a host of other determinative forces to constitute
program results. In evaluating a particular experiment, a method such
as impact analysis is needed to discern each outcome of interest from
other aspects of program results. A review of existing evaluations shows
a variety of measures used for each outcome of interest. This suggests
that there are no absolute measures of time savings, cost savings, fairness, and others, just as there are no absolute measures of effectiveness.
Consequently, measures of the seven outcomes of interest are indirect
and must make implicit or explicit comparisons with a counterfactual.
Hence, the measures reported by impact studies are not absolute assessments of program success; rather, each impact study compares the degree to which its treatment group achieves an outcome of interest as
compared to its own control group.
However, this need not be a problem in comparing results. The
New Formalist perspective assumes that each of these outcomes is determined by the same underlying laws of social behavior. Therefore, an
overview of various independent measures should demonstrate an overall pattern of outcomes which reveals their common determination by
the same laws of social action. In fact, the variety of different measures
of outcome used by the various impact studies should provide a more
convincing confirmation of these underlying laws. Webb, Campbell,
Schwartz and Sechrest write:
Once a proposition has been confirmed by two or more independent measurement processes, the uncertainty of its interpretation is greatly reduced. The most persuasive evidence
comes through a triangulation of measurement processes. If a
proposition can survive the onslaught of a series of imperfect
measures, with
all their irrelevant error, confidence should be
55
placed in it.

In short, while the variety of measures produced by different studies
54. This accounts, perhaps, for the failure of many impact studies to explicitly identify
their counterfactual. If an evaluator believes that he is measuring his objective of interest
directly, then he feels no need to contrast this measure with a standard for comparison.
55. E. WEBB, D. CAMPBELL, R. SCHWARTZ & L. SECHREST, UNOBTRUSIVE MEASURES:
NORMATIVE RESEARCH IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 4 (1973).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

528

[Vol. 66:3

CHART IV
Specification of a Theory of Dispute Processing
as Defined by the New Formalist Perspective
Type of Mechanism
X,

X2

X3

X4

X5

X6

X7...Xk

WI

Y

Y2

Y3

Y4

Y5

Y6

Y7 ... Yk

W2

Y8

Y9

Y10

Y1

Y 12

Y 13

YI4 ...Ym

W3

Y 15

Y 16

Y 17

Y 18

Y19

Y 20

Y2 1... Y.

W

4

Y 22

Y23

Y 24

Y 25

Y 26

Y 27

Y28 ...Yo

D
i

W5

Y29

Y30

Y 31

Y32

Y3

Y34

Y35--Yp

S

W6

Y36

Y37

Y38

Y39

Y40

Y4 1

Y4 2 ... Yq

W

Y 43

Y 44

Y45

Y46

Y47

Y48

Y 49 ... Yr

:
Y.

:

.

Yb

Yc

Ye

Yf

Yg...Y,

T
y
p
e
o

f

p
U

7

t

e

Wk

:

.

Yd

Where:
Xk

Wk

Yk

ak

bk
ck

= Type of Mechanism = adjudication, arbitration,
mediation, negotiation, private judging,
neutral expert fact-finding, minitrial,
ombudsman, and summary jury trial.
= Type of Dispute = civil cases under $150,000, civil
cases under $50,000, civil cases under
$25,000, etc., or consumer disputes,
education disputes, employment disputes,
etc.
= Type of Outcome = more effective vis-a-vis
counterfactual, less effective vis-a-vis
counterfactual.
= Mechanism Characteristics = voluntariness,
bindingness, third party type, degree of
formality, nature of proceeding, nature of
outcome, private or public proceeding.
= Dispute Characteristics = undefined.
= Outcome Characteristics = time, cost, party
satisfaction, equity, fairness, permanence,
community.
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CHART V
Effectiveness of Outcome Measures From Evalhiations of Family

Mediation Programs
EFFECTIVENESS

OF OUTCOME M

MEDIATION

Outcome

Measure of

More Effective

Characteristic

Effectiveness

Vis-a-Vis

Vis-a-Vis

Characteristic

Counterfactual

Counterfactual

Less Effective

Time

Average Disposition
Time

Cost

Average Cost per
Case for the Court
System

Pearson, 1981

Cost

Average Cost per
Case for the
Disputants

Bahr, 1981

Pearson, 1982

Maddi, 1977

Time/Cost

Court Backlog

Merry, 1985

Party Satisfaction

Disputant and/or
Counsel Satisfaction
with Outcome

Pearson, 1984
Bahr, 1981

Party Satisfaction

Disputant and/or
Counsel Satisfaction
with Process

Merry, 1985
Pearson, 1981,
1982, 1984

Equity

Equity of Access
Across Disputant
Characteristics

Equity

Equality of
Outcome Across
Disputant
Characteristics

Pearson, 1981

Fairness

Disputants and/or
Counsel Perceive
Program to be a
Fairer Process

Merry, 1985
Pearson, 1984
Bahr, 1981

Permanence

Longer Lasting
Resolution

Merry, 1985
Pearson, 1982,
1984

Community

Strengthens
Community

Pearson, 1981
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does not allow one to compare fine differences in the degree to which
effectiveness is achieved, it does permit one to stand back and compare
crude patterns in these reported outcomes. A rough standardization
across studies can be achieved by determining in each case whether or
not the application of the treatment improved the outcome of interest as
compared to the counterfactual case. Reducing outcome measures to
"yes or no" answers facilitates a search for patterns in outcomes. The
one drawback to this approach is that it does not permit the aggregation
of outcome-of-interest measures into a single measure of overall program effectiveness.
C. Mapping Outcomes
In attempting to organize evaluation results in the form called for
by a New Formalist theory of dispute processing, I have had to accept a
number of assumptions. I have accepted:
1. The three propositions which constitute the New Formalist
perspective.
2. The premises of impact analysis.
3. That the essential types of dispute processing mechanisms
(Xk) are the eight identified by Goldberg, Green, and Sander.
4. That the essential types of disputes (Wk) include, correspond to, or fall within (but are not necessarily exhausted by),
the jurisdictional limits used by existing programs.
5. That the general characteristics of system effectiveness (Ck)
assessed by existing evaluations can be summarized as cost,
time, permanency, fairness, party satisfaction, equity,
community.
6. That different statistical measures of the same outcome of
interest can be standardized by expressing each outcome as
either "improvement over its counterfactual" or "no improvement over its counterfactual." 5 6
Chart IV illustrates how these assumptions give specification to the general theory of dispute processing provided in Chart I.
If these six assumptions are acceptable, then the outcomes of published impact studies can be compared by coding them onto Chart IV.
Unfortunately, actually producing such a chart is difficult given the fact
that the effectiveness of each program involves seven or more measures.
Therefore, I have taken two steps to make my presentation of these results more manageable. First, I have only coded outcome measures for
arbitration and mediation because Charts II and III show that these are
the only mechanism types which have a sufficient number of data points
(individual outcome measures from individual programs) to manifest
any pattern of outcomes. Second, in coding these results I have eliminated differentiation of evaluations by dispute type. These two steps
56. We should also keep in mind that: (1) our categorization of types of mechanisms
and types of disputes may be slightly off; and (2) the validity of various outcomes vary
because the validity of the research designs used vary.

1989]

EVALUATIONS OF DISPUTE PROCESSING

allow me to present a manageable summary of empirical measures of
outcomes in Chart V.
While I cannot actually present a version of Chart IV fully coded
with the outcome measures from all evaluated mediation and arbitration
programs, Charts II, III, and V provide the reader with the raw materials
she needs to construct such a chart herself. To construct a fully coded
version of Chart IV or one of its cells, use Charts II and III to identify
the evaluations that have actually tested a given combination of mechanism and dispute type. Then use Chart V to identify the measures taken
by each evaluation identified.
For purposes of illustration, I will present a coding of measures for
a single combination of mechanism and dispute type (a single cell in
Chart III): evaluation results of programs which have applied mediation
to family disputes. These evaluations of family mediation are compared
in Chart VI.
With the help of Chart VI, we can use the empirical results from
evaluations of family mediation to test several of the New Formalism's
key assumptions. If New Formalist assumptions are correct, then it
would be expected that Chart VI would demonstrate certain patterns in
outcomes.
First and foremost, New Formalist assumptions predict that several
programs with the same or similar mechanism and jurisdiction features
should yield the same results. However, Chart VI demonstrates that this
expectation is not substantiated by impact studies of family mediation.
In Chart VI, we see that programs with the same general mechanism and
the same general jurisdiction yield opposite results. Bahr, 57 Merry &
Rocheleau 58 find a reduction in costs vis-a-vis their counterfactual while
Pearson & Thoennes 59 and Maddi 60 find an increase in costs vis-a-vis
their counterfactual.
Second, New Formalist assumptions predict that a given program
should yield consistent results across the seven outcomes of interest.
Contrary to these expectations, Chart VI demonstrates differences
across measures for a given program. Pearson & Thoennes 6 1 find a less
efficient cost vis-a-vis their counterfactual but more efficient party satisfaction vis-a-vis their counterfactual. Similar inconsistencies can be
found by comparing results from impact studies evaluating other combinations of mechanism and jurisdiction type.
57. Bahr, Mediation is the Answer, 3 FAM. ADVOc. 32 (1981).
58. S. MERRY & A. ROCHELEAU, MEDIATION IN FAMILIES: A STUDY OF THE CHILDREN'S
HEARINGS PROJECT (1985).
59. Pearson & Thoennes, Mediation and Divorce: The Benefits Outweigh the Costs, 4 FAM.
ADVOc. 26 (1982).
60. Maddi, The Effect of Conciliation Court Proceedingson Petitionsfor Dissolutionof Marriage,
13J. FAM. L. 767 (1977).
61. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 59.
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Conclusions

Because New Formalist assumptions present themselves as descriptions of reality, we often fail to recognize that these assumptions are just
that: assumptions. Further, because these assumptions call for an empirical research strategy, we often fail to recognize that the assumptions
themselves are rarely subjected to this empirical testing.
While the inconsistency of results manifested Chart V, together
with similar inconsistencies identifiable through Chart VI, do not definitively disprove the assumptions of the New Formalism, 62 such discrepancies between the pattern of results anticipated by New Formalist
assumptions and the pattern of results actually found in existing impact
studies highlights the importance of questioning and testing New Formalism's assumptions. We should make these claims explicit and examine their veracity before we allow them to chart our reform projects
for the future.
IV.

NEw

FORMALISM's BLIND SPOTS: WE Do NOT THINK
WHAT WE KNOW

I have argued that evaluators use the New Formalist perspective to
frame their experience of particular programs and to relate the significance of these experiences to their readers. In the preceding section, I
used this perspective to frame a review and synthesis of various evaluation results. In so doing, I accepted without question the truthfulness of
New Formalism's assumptions. In this section, I will demonstrate that
framing our experience with this perspective narrows our field of vision
and blinds us to the significance of certain experiences and insights
which fall outside its boundaries. In so doing, I will call into question
the usefulness and the truthfulness of New Formalism's assumptions.
A.

How New Formalism Structures Program Experience

When an evaluator or her readers adopt a New Formalist perspective, their experience of a program is framed in a particular way. This
framing conforms that experience to the principle elements of impact
analysis: program theory, research design, and quantified measures.
Program Theory
The dispute processing field brings together groups with different
agendas: court administrators are concerned with the time and cost involved in processing cases and with the court backlogs that delays
create; liberal legal practitioners are concerned that traditional adjudica62. They can be explained in a manner which does not challenge the perspective.
From within a New Formalist perspective, inconsistencies such as those in Chart VI result
because (1) existing impact studies yield invalid results because they follow poor research
design; (2) an insufficient number of studies exist to discern between small but significant
variations in mechanism or jurisdiction type; or (3) the measures are not properly
comparable.
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tion constitutes an institutional barrier to the provision of equal access
to justice; professionals in mediation, arbitration, and other non-traditional dispute resolution skills seek to advance their technique, and their
practice of that technique, as social reform; and other groups as well.
While the New Formalist perspective is not the source of these various interests, it does provide a framework which appears to bring these
interests and strategies of action together under a common project. Because the New Formalism relies on a systems logic, it does not have to
specify the values or interests which are achieved by securing a proper fit
between mechanism type and dispute type. By assuming that "effective"
correlations are defined by laws of social behavior, the New Formalism
implicitly assumes that all values and interests are maximized when a
match established between a mechanism and a dispute corresponds to
the social laws governing dispute processing. 6 3 It can thus present itself
as a framework which combines various interests without privileging any
one, and presents the advancement of these interests as an objective and
scientific project of enlightened reason.
However, the seven outcomes of interest which dispute processing
experiments are designed to achieve are stated so abstractly that no specific content can be given to these terms. Rather, a variety of meanings
can be read into each of these phrases and these interpretations can be
changed from time to time and from place to place. Each phrase has
been used to refer to a number of diferent benefits assumed to accrue to a
number of different actors through a number of different intervening mechanisms or subobjectives.
Consider as an example, one of the most common goals used to
rationalize dispute resolution innovations: minimized cost. The assertion that, for example, a court-annexed arbitration program can 'improve efficiency' has been interpreted to mean:
1. That the court system will experience a decreased average
cost for processing filed cases due to an earlier settlement of
disputes.
2. That the court system will experience a decreased average
cost for processing filed cases due to the use of a less costly
alternative preceding (due, perhaps, to the use of volunteer arbitrators rather than high-salaried judges).
3. That the court system will experience a decreased average
cost for processing filed cases because the court system can
process cases remaining in the courts in a faster or less-expensive manner.
4. That the court system will save money because arbitration
63. A muted form of New Formalism can be constructed which does, not assume that
all outcome characteristics are simultaneously maximized. In this form, exemplified by
Bush, supra note 26, it is acknowledged that some outcomes of interest may be mutually
incompatible with other outcomes of interest. However, this muted approach still assumes
that "optimum outcomes" are possible. Rather than maximizing all outcome characteristics simultaneously, these outcomes provide the most improvement for the most outcomes
possible despite some loss in a few outcomes. Note that even in this case selection of the
most "effective" design remains a technical question rather than a question of values.
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provides longer-lasting settlements, thereby eliminating the
costs of processing future recidivism.
5. That disputants save money directly because arbitration
decreases attorney fees or decreases witness fees and other trial
costs.
6. That disputants save money indirectly because arbitration
renders earlier settlements, thereby reducing the amount of
time disputants must miss work to tend to their dispute.
Table II lists these and other advantages, interests, and mechanisms
which I found through a cursory review of the literature. The purpose
of this table is not to provide an exhaustive enumeration, but rather to
demonstrate how quickly such a list proliferates. The reader is invited
to identify advantages, interests, and mechanisms not included in Table
II as a demonstration that this list is not, and cannot be, exhaustive.
By bringing together a variety of interests under its common framework, the New Formalism does not thereby guarantee that all evaluations conducted within its premises will address each of these interests.
It does assume, however, that evaluations which overemphasize the examination of one set of problems can eventually be integrated with evaluations which examine other types of problems. It also assumes that
once the right match between mechanism type and dispute type is
found, that all interests will be simultaneously achieved. In other words,
the New Formalist framework assumes that one set of interests need not
be advanced at the expense of others. If one set of interests does suffer,
it is due solely to ignorance (insufficient knowledge) or error (insufficient dissemination of what we know). Both can be corrected through
expanded experimentation and evaluation.
Unfortunately, the evaluations themselves present evidence that the
objectives of dispute processing experiments are neither consensual nor
commensurate. All groups in the dispute processing field do not agree
on all the objectives advanced and furthermore it is impossible to
achieve all the objectives advanced simultaneously. Also, just as the
seven characteristics of effective outcomes identified above may not be
consensual nor commensurate, so each of these issues may serve as umbrella terms for a variety of non-consensual and contradictory outcomes.
For example, Hensler, Lipson and Rolph found that court-annexed arbitration in California reduced case-processing costs to disputants while
simultaneously increasing case costs to the state. 6 4 They also found that
arbitration may cost the state more while costing the counties less.
Therefore, one cannot make statements such as: "arbitration reduces
costs."
Charts II, III and V provide us with a means to test the New Formalist assertion that there is an ideal correlation of types of dispute processing mechanisms to types of disputes. New Formalist assumptions
suggest that a given treatment should advance all seven issues simulta64. D.
FIRST YEAR

HENSLER, A. LIPSON

(1981).

&

E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: THE
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neously. If this assumption is true, then we should find a consistent pattern of outcomes for a given program across the seven outcomes of
interest. If, for example, arbitration is ideally suited to processing all
civil disputes of valuation less than $10,000.00, then the evaluation testing this type of program should find improvement in cost, time, permanency of resolution, fairness, party satisfaction, equality, and improved
community. In other words, the same pattern of "yes" and "no" should
appear on a chart like Chart IV. However, a review of Chart VI shows
this not to be the case. For almost all measures of effectiveness, experimental outcomes show both positive and negative results vis-a-vis the
counterfactual. Inconsistency in outcomes even occurs within a given
65
study.
Research Design
The New Formalist perspective, through its appropriation of impact
analysis, assumes that if we are able to construct a good research design
for our experimental program and data analysis (before and after treatment data collection, random assignment between treatment and control group, and so on), then we can be certain that the empirical data
produced are a valid description or measure of the way things are. Conversely, if we are unable to implement a good research design, then the
validity of our data will be questionable.
Unfortunately, given the conditions under which adjudication and
the alternatives to adjudication are implemented, a program can rarely
meet the rigid demands of good research design. Program implementors have interests Other than good research design in implementing programs. 66 And even where program implementors are willing to
try their best to incorporate good design features like random assignment of disputes into their experimental program, the pressures and responsibilities of public institutions and the rights of individuals
processed through those institutions makes it difficult to maintain the
design. Several arbitration programs have attempted random selection,
and in both cases, judges had to acquiesce to disputant demands that
they have their right to a trial immediately (rather than follow through
67
on their random assignment to an arbitration hearing).
The consequence of the application of these rigid standards for research design to programs which are almost always either unwilling or
unable to incorporate these designs is that evaluators and their readers
are continually troubled by the validity of their findings. As a result,
65. See, e.g., Weller, Ruhnka & Martin, Compulsory Civil Arbitration: The Rochester Answer
to Court Backlogs, 20 JUDGES J. 3 (1982) (arbitration); R. COOK, J. ROEHL & D. SHEPPARD,
NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS FIELD TEST-FINAL EVALUATION REPORT (1980)
(mediation).
66. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE
LAW, supra note 37.
67. See A. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 2; M. ROSENBERG, PRETRIAL CONFERENCES
AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964).

For an example of similar pressures in experimentation

with ombudsman programs, see Gwyn, Obstacles within the Office of Economic Opportunity to the
Evaluation of Experimental Ombudsmen, 1976 PUB. ADMIN. 177, 185.
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when various impact studies produce inconsistent outcomes, New Formalists are predisposed to blame these inconsistencies on the poor validity of their data rather than the usefulness of New Formalist
assumptions. This makes poor research design, coupled with the small
number of evaluations which have entered the professional literature, an
easy scapegoat for all the shortcomings which true believers in New Formalist assumptions find between the empirical data actually accumulated
and the expectations promised by the New Formalist perspective.
Quantified Measures
The New Formalist perspective assumes that disputes and, dispute
processing programs are things with essential characteristics. It therefore seeks to explain variations in outcome in terms of variations in the
essential characteristics of these mechanisms and dispute types. If it
finds variation within essential types or change in these objects over
time, it ascribes this change to the current state of empirical evidence
rather than to a fault in the assumptions.
When impact analysis is used in the service of New Formalist objectives, further limits are placed on the types of experience which are recognized as valid and legitimate assessments of outcome. Impact analysis
requires assessing the extent of the divergence between the outcome of
treatment and the counterfactual using a quantified measure. Therefore, non-quantifiable sources of experience are either eliminated or the
time, effort, and importance given to their investigation limited.
The field of valid experience is restricted yet again when one considers the extent to which quantifiable data is actually available in the
evaluation of dispute processes. Existing dispute processing programs
offer limited sources for data which are subject to quantification and statistical manipulation. A review of the literature shows that the quantitative data used in dispute processing evaluations is almost exclusively
derived from program records, forms designed by evaluators and filled
out by program staff, and interviews with or questionnaires given to parties, lawyers, third party interveners, and program administrators. Consequently, there is a relatively small set of quantitative measures which
evaluators tend to depend on in constructing, conducting, and reporting
their evaluations, and which their readers tend to draw on in cross-comparing their work.
Unfortunately, while there is some consistency in measures used,
there is great difference in how these measures are interpreted. Consider "average case duration" as a measure of the outcome "time
saved." Some studies, such as Adler, Hensler and Nelson interpret a
decrease in average case duration as a measure of successful time reduction.6 8 Other studies, like Lind and Shapard, interpret a decrease in
average case time as a measure of successful cost reduction. 6 9 Still other
68. J. ADLER, D. HENSLER & C. NELSON, SIMPLE JUSTICE: How LTGANTS FARE IN THE
PrITSBURGH ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1983).

69. A. LIND &J. SHAPARD, supra note 2.
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studies, such as McEwen and Maiman, interpret an increase in average
case duration as an increase in the judge time applied to the case, which
in turn is interpreted to be a measure of successful increases in fairness
because McEwen and Maiman assume that increased judge time pro70
vides a fairer hearing.
In addition to variations in how measures are interpreted, there are
also variations in the manner in which these measures are constructed.
Even when evaluations are able to'agree on the same theoretically-defined
measure for assessing the same outcome of interest, differences in constraints force them to construct the same measure in different ways.
These different ways of constructing the same "measure" often involve
different types of data and different assumptions.
72
7
Compare, for example, Hensler 1 with Felstiner and Williams.
Both evaluations attempt to measure the general outcome "reduced
costs." Both attempt to assess this goal using the same theoreticallydefined measure: a comparison of the average cost of processing a case
in an innovative program with the average cost of processing the case
using traditional adjudication. Both find that data regarding this seemingly straightforward measure does not exist. Therefore, both research
teams are forced to construct estimates using proxy data and assumptions. In each case, selecting different proxy data or going the other way
on a required assumption can mean the difference between finding the
program successful or unsuccessful in achieving its goal of cost savings.
These differences make it highly questionable whether the findings
of these two studies can be compared. This is true even if the studies
are using the same measure and even if they both come up with a quantitative estimate of the "same" measure.
B.

The Return of the Repressed

New Formalist assumptions have a powerful impact on the manner
in which the evaluations literature is produced and read. Its tendency to
narrow one's field of vision in the ways outlined above is powerful as
well. Nevertheless, such a framework is not the only perspective which
guides our experience. I have argued that the New Formalism is not the
exclusive determinant of the questions, structure, strategy, or perspective of any single concrete evaluation. Despite the powerful influence
which the New Formalist perspective has over how individual evaluators
pattern their observations, program experiences which are not consistent with New Formalist assumptions but whose importance in determining outcomes is self-evident to the evaluator often do work their way
into written evaluations. In this section I would like to examine a few of
the insights reported in the evaluations literature which are often over70. McEwen & Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An EmpiricalAssessment, 33 ME.
LAW REv. 237 (1981)..
71. D. HENSLER, A. LIPSON & E. ROLPH, supra note 64.
72. W. FELSTINER & L. WILLIAMS, COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN DORCHESTER, MASSACHUsETTs (1980).
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looked in the search for effective correlations between disputes and
mechanisms. They are overlooked because they challenge"the assumptions of the New Formalist framework.
We might consider the insistent presence of these insights despite
the power of New Formalism's assumptions to filter experience as "the
return of the repressed." Despite New Formalism's tendency to "repress" these observations because they are not recognized as significant
in relation to other observations, the determinative importance of these
repressed experiences continues to impress the observer to the point
where they "return." That is, they work their way into the text of an
evaluation despite the fact that they violate the assumptions which frame
and explain what the evaluation reports as significant.
Institutional Features
Within the New Formalist framework, certain general institutional
features of programs are viewed as essential defining characteristic
which distinguish which type of mechanism the program is. For example, the acceptance of a hearing with a third-party decision maker is an
institutional feature which coupled with other essential characteristics
defines a program as an example of arbitration. In contrast, other institutional features which are more specific to particular programs, are
viewed as inessential characteristics which distinguish one arbitration
program from another.
The New Formalism allows for such variations within essential types
of mechanisms. While these features may affect the degree to which a
given program "fits" with a particular type of dispute, the occurrence of
a non-essential, "accidental" feature should not change the "fit."
Otherwise, New Formalist assumptions would be violated.
Nevertheless, a review of existing evaluations finds an argument for
the importance of specific process features to be one of the most recurring conclusions across studies. For example, Lind and Shapard find in
their study of court-annexed arbitration that the success of the program
in reducing processing time is a direct consequence of a court rule demanding that the arbitration hearing take place within a specific period
of time:
It appears that court-annexed arbitration can serve as an effective deadline for case preparation, substituting for trial not as a
forum for case resolution, but as a stimulus to settlement.
Questionnaires from counsel whose cases were terminated
prior to arbitration support the view that the arbitration rule
and show general endorsement of the arexpedited settlement
73
bitration rules.
Such a rule, however, is never cited as an essential defining feature of
arbitration.
If the success of an arbitration program in reducing the duration of
73. A.

LIND &J. SHAPARD,

supra note 2, at xiii.
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a case vis-a-vis the regular adjudication process is dependent on certain
institutional features which may not be present in every arbitration program, then specifying this feature must be a necessary qualification
whenever the results of arbitration are discussed or compared. This directly challenges the New Formalist assumption that all institutionalizations of a given type of mechanism share essential properties which
make them ideally suited to deal with particular types of disputes.
In order to preserve this assumption, New Formalism must assume
that arbitration with a time limit provision and arbitration without a time
limit provision are entirely different types of mechanisms. However, if
we further divide Sander's eight types into a larger number of mechanism types on the basis of differences in their institutional features, then
the number of permutations quickly threatens the parsimoniousness of
the model. Consequently, following this path to save New Formalism's
assumptions has consequences which call these assumptions into doubt.
Even more damaging to the assumptions of New Formalism are the
conclusions by some studies that the importance of specific institutional
features changes from program to program, place to place, and time to
time. For example, Shuart, Smith and Polanet, in their study of mediation in Wayne County, Michigan, conclude that:
A settlement mechanism must be designed to meet the needs
and to utilize the resources of the jurisdiction developing a procedure .... The experience in Wayne County highlights those
procedural aspects which should be considered in planning a
settlement device: the administration and financing of the procedure, the type of settlement technique employed, the composition and selection of the valuation body, the timing of the
hearing, the selection of appropriate cases, the format of the
hearing, and the inclusion of the penalty. The importance may not
be in the way each74of these aspects is ultimately handled, but rather that
each is addressed.
This conclusion directly contradicts the most fundamental assumptions
of New Formalism that specific mechanisms, disputes, and outcomes
hold essential characteristics across time and space.
Dispute Characteristics
The New Formalism assumes that disputes are things that are present in every society. It therefore begins with the assumption that they
exist, and goes on to question the most effective way to process them.
The selection of a mechanism is a purely technical matter. Dispute
processing mechanisms are tools which are more or less useful in dealing with the inevitable problem of disputes.
However, consider the conclusions emerging from some evaluations regarding the characteristics of disputants who use the treatments
tested and who win or lose in the outcomes determined by the treat74. Shuart, Smith & Polanet, Settling Cases in Detroit: An Examination of Wayne County's
"Mediation" Program, 8 JusT. Sys. J. 307, 323 (1983) (emphasis added).
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ments. These questions can be legitimately raised from within the New
Formalist perspective. Optimal outcomes should include maximization
of fairness and equality as outcomes. But addressing these questions
from within New Formalism brings results that have implications more
for the question of where disputes comefrom and why they end up in experimental programs than how the programs treat these disputes.
For example, Cook, Roehl and Sheppard found that there was an
over-representation of low income persons in the cases processed by
Neighborhood Justice Centers:
The information gathered on disputants indicates, with the exception of individuals representing businesses, that the people
who use the NJCs are generally representative of the community in terms of ethnicity. However, it appears that the NJCs
attract primarily low income residents. This may be partially a
reflection ... of the characteristics of the litigants in the court
system. It may also be the case that middle-and upper-income
people tend to hire third party (attorneys, counselors, etc.) to
resolve their disputes. On the other hand, this finding indicates that the NJCs are providing dispute resolution services to
poor people, some of whom may have had less access to the
justice system in the past. But if, as originally intended, the
Centers are to serve a cross-section of their communities, they
will have to attract more higher income citizens. 7 5
Note that the lesson the evaluation draws from its quantitative results is
that the goal of equality (equal access to justice) is being achieved. Further, the rationale for why low-income people are over represented in
the NJCs is that this reflects who uses the court system. The interesting
question here, however, is not whether the operation of the system increases access, but for whom is access increased and for what purposes.
This raises the question of where disputes come from, and why one type
of disputant tends to use, or be channeled, into public dispute processing agencies while other types are not. The results suggest that where
disputes are taken differs by economic class. However, since the New
Formalist perspective assumes that dispute types are formally the same
everywhere (regardless of changes in the class of the disputants), that
they occur naturally in all societies, and that they are individual objects,
this perspective cannot explain why economic class is an important indicator of the dispute process utilized.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the past two decades, the New Formalist perspective has given
the dispute processing field a set of comforting explanations as to what
the field is, what it should do, and how its work can contribute to a better future. However, while New Formalist assumptions have inspired
useful scientific research and improved social policy making, the results
of the research so inspired have not substantiated the intellectual coher75. R. CooK, J. ROEHL & D.

SHEPPARD,

supra note 65, at 107.
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ence which these assumptions promise and predict. New Formalist assumptions have also blinded researchers to the significance of certain
data which they have collected in their research. There is a good deal of
data which has impressed these researchers as significant experiences
but which has not been analyzed because it violates New Formalist definitions of significance. Most importantly, New Formalist premises have
blinded the dispute processing field to the political dimensions of dispute processing and dispute processing research. Therefore, as we assess the current state of empirical knowledge in the dispute processing
field, it is important that we also assess the framework we are using to
evaluate this knowledge.
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TABLE II
I.

Economic Benefits to Court System:
(a) Decrease in average cost of ADR-processed cases because of:
i.
earlier settlement of disputes.
ii. less costly processing of disputes.
(b) Decrease in average cost of traditionally-processed cases because:
i.
reduction in number of court-processed cases provides reduction in
amount of court resources required.
ii. preliminary processing by ADR procedure decreases length of traditional
adjudication or encourages selection of less-costly adjudication
procedures.
(c) Reduction in number of cases because of:
i.
longer lasting resolutions to processed disputes.
ii. improved resolutions resulting in improved social relations which result
in fewer new disputes.

2.

Economic Benefits to Disputants:
(a) Decreased costs for case processed by ADR program because of:
i.
decreased attorney fees.
ii.
decreased incidental case costs.
iii. decreased average processing time for case.
iv. more flexible timing of hearings.
v. disputant found eligible for social service benefits.
(b) Decreased costs for case which remains in the now-less-backlogged court
system because of:
i.
decreased attorney fees.
ii.
decreased incidental case costs.
iii. decreased average processing time for case.

3.

Political Benefits To Court System:
(a) Reduced community conflict.
(b) Increased legitimation of court system.

4.

Political Benefits to Disputants:
(a) Quicker settlements/resolutions.
(b) Improved access to justice.
(c) Longer lasting resolution of conflits.
(d) Improved quality of case preparation and presentation.
(e) Improved quality of settlement/resolution decision.
(f)
Increased responsiveness of government.
(g) Empowerment of individuals in determining their social relations.

5.

Political Benefits to the Community:
(a) Decreased conflict between individuals/groups/government.
(b) Underlying community norms rendered explicit.
(c) Increased local autonomy vis-a-vis state and national institutions.
(d) Development of local leadership with dispute settlement skills.

6.

Benefits to Policy Intellectuals and Professionals:
(a) Increased funding for research.
(b) Increased funding for program.
(c) Increased acceptance, jurisdiction, and/or use of program.
(d) Increased acceptance and use of general program type.

7.

Benefits to Program Planners and Third Party Intervenors:
(a) Increased knowledge regarding effective implementation techniques.
(b) Increased knowledge regarding effective third party intervenor skills.
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EVALUATIONS OF*DISPUTE PROCESSING
A

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF DIsPuTE PROCESSING EVALUATIONS

The accompanying article argues that proponents of the' New-Formalist approach to the study of dispute processing and social scientists
trained in impact analysis have combined a particular project for policy
reform with a distinctive project of social science research to establish a
joint strategy of social reform. More specifically, this joint strategy seeks
to identify an enlightened system of dispute processing institutions
through experimentation with and evaluation of various dispute
processing mechanisms.
This bibliography identifies publications which contribute to this
project. It is less than a list of all articles addressing dispute resolution,
but is more than a list ofjust impact studies. Because the impact study is
the pre-eminent form of New Formalist evaluation and the central focus
of the accompanying article, I have attempted to provide a complete list
of all published impact studies of dispute processing programs which
contribute to our general knowledge of dispute processing while defining and improving the internal operation of the program assessed.
However, I have also provided a less than complete list of other types of
publications which advance the New Formalist project. I call this body
of work "the evaluations literature."
The evaluations literature can be separated into six categories according to the contribution they make to the New Formalist project:
Impact Studies: As the accompanying article suggests, the consummate type of New Formalist evaluation is the impact study. Impact studies use scientific methods of quantitative measurement to assess the
outcomes produced by a particular dispute processing program or system of programs.
Case Studies: This category includes evaluations of dispute processing programs which neither make New Formalist assumptions nor use
impact analysis as their assessment technology. From a New Formalist
perspective, these studies are enigmas because the purpose of the
method used, the case study, and the form of the material presented are
incongruous with the purposes, methods, and forms of presentation
used by impact analysis. Of course, most evaluations combine elements
of both impact analysis and case study. If a study includes even a few
elements of impact analysis study, I have included it in the impact studies category.
DescriptionsofParticularPrograms: When government agencies or private foundations institute an experimental program, or when government agencies, foundations, or academics identify an existing program
which might have relevance for future reform, they often undertake or
commission a description of the implementation and operation of the
pilot program. These works are not impact or case studies because they
do not attempt to assess or explain program outcomes. Rather, they
simply describe the institutional design of the program.
DescriptiveReviews of Alternatives: If a policy maker is considering the

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 66:3

design and implementation of a dispute resolution program, then she
needs descriptive reviews of alternatives which can be considered in selecting and constructing a program. These descriptions may review
ideal typologies of general mechanism types (such as the Goldberg,
Green and Sander typology reproduced in Table 1), may review the
range of existing programs (to serve as models to be emulated), or may
combine descriptions of existing programs with prescriptions for untried designs. Such descriptive reviews are included in this category.
This category also includes a second type of descriptive review. As the
number of innovative dispute resolution programs have outstripped
carefully planned experimentation, policy makers and intellectuals concerned with the administration of justice as a system have sought to discover what is out there. This second type of descriptive review is
constructed for purposes of comprehending the extent to which various
types of innovations have been institutionalized and the degree to which
this institutional development has been coordinated. The scope of
these reviews is sometimes limited by the jurisdictional boundaries of
the institution initiating the study.
Methodological Prescriptionsfor Good Case Studies: There are a few articles written to provide evaluators with "good" research designs to be
used when conducting impact analyses. These studies provide a methodological framework for collecting and analyzing data in a manner
which provides valid and comparable results. These methodological
prescriptions usually do not collect and analyze actual data themselves.
General Research Using Other Methodologies: This is a residual category.
It includes articles which contribute to the general knowledge of dispute
processing using research methodologies other than evaluation and impact analysis. These studies are often based on data surveys covering a
number of programs simultaneously. For example, Brazil constructs
general statements regarding the nature of judicial settlement from
questionnaires sent to a sample of attorneys who have had experience
with this technique.
The State of Existing Knowledge: This final category includes literature
reviews which identify and assess the state of general knowledge regarding dispute processing or a subcategory of the field. These articles review the extent to which knowledge regarding the characteristics of
various techniques, various forms of institutionalizing these techniques,
and the characteristics of various disputes processed by these techniques, have been collected and empirically verified. Also included in
this category are a number of reviews which limit the scope of their
study to knowledge derived from programs or studies conducted by the
organization instituting or conducting the evaluations reviewed.
Because the impact study is the preeminent New Formalist evaluation, I have provided more than simple bibliographic information for
the publications in this category. In addition to the full cite, I have specified the following information for each impact study identified:
1. The Technique Evaluated: Using Goldberg, Green, and
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Sander's nine-fold typology (see Table 1), I have specified whether the
program or system of programs evaluated can best be characterized as
adjudication, arbitration, mediation, negotiation, private judging, neutral expert fact-finding, a mini-trial, an ombudsman, or a summary jury
trial.
2. Program Jurisdiction: This entry specifies the type of institution which administers the program and its geographic jurisdiction.
These include federal (district) courts, state courts (county courts of
general jurisdiction), limited jurisdiction state courts (municipal courts),
public non-profit organizations (organizations that operate on a national
scale), community programs (non-profit public organizations that operate on the local level), or private programs (programs run by private forprofit organizations).
3. Case Types: This entry specifies the substantive jurisdiction of
the program as defined by its rules. These rules define the types of cases
which the program will and will not accept for processing.
4. Program Evaluated: This entry identifies the specific program
or programs evaluated.
5. Data Sources: This entry identifies the types of data used by the
study to assess the impact of the program. These include program
records, questionnaires, interviews, and participant observation.
For a summary of this information and of the outcomes measured,
see the accompanying charts.
I began the construction of this bibliography by searching through
the footnotes and sources of a handful of well known evaluations and
general articles on dispute processing. I then moved through the footnotes and sources of each new cite until no new references appeared. I
then double checked the resulting list for completeness by reviewing
standard legal bibliographic sources: The Index to Legal Periodicals,
The Legal Resources Index, and The Current Law Legal Resources Index. The following is the product of this search.
I.

J.

ADLER,

D.

HENSLER

& C.

IMPACT STUDIES

NELSON, SIMPLE JUSTICE:

FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH ARBITRATION PROGRAM

How

LITIGANTS

(1983).

TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Compulsory Arbitration.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: County.
CASE TYPES: Civil cases under $10,000.00.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Pittsburgh (Allegheny County)
Court of Common Appeals.
DATA SOURCES: Review of state authorizing statutes and local court rules; interviews with court administrative staff and
attorneys active in arbitration as arbiters or as counsel; on site
observation of cases; abstracted information from court files
for a sample of 544 cases from all cases for 1980 and 1981; a
sample of 157 cases appealed between 1979 and 1981; interviews with a non-random sample of 66 litigants prior to hear-
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ing, immediately after hearing, and after announcement of
award; interviews with 15 attorneys and 14 institutional litigants (insurance companies, financial institutions, etc.).
Bahr, Mediation is the Answer, 3 FAMILY ADVOCATE 32 (1981).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Mediation.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Private.
CASE TYPES: Divorce.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Family Mediation Service, McLean,
Va. and Fairfax County Courts.
DATA SOURCES: Questionnaires to a sample of privately mediated cases and a sample of county court adjudicated cases.
W.

BALES & J.

IN FLORIDA:

PLANCHARD, THE CITIZEN DISPuTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS

A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT (1980).

TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Mediation (Consumer Dispute
Settlement).
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: County.
CASE TYPES: Misdemeanor and Small Claims.
Comment, Compulsory Arbitration In Pennsylvania, 2 VILL. L. REV. 529
(1957).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Compulsory Arbitration (three
lawyer panel).
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Limited jurisdiction county civil
courts (court-annexed).
CASE TYPES: Civil cases under $1,000.00.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Court-annexed compulsory arbitration of Delaware and Montgomery (Pa.) County Courts.
DATA SOURCES: 130 questionnaires of lawyers in two PA
counties with compulsory arbitration. Survey of 10 counties.
Cerino & Rainone, The New Wave: Speedy Arbitration Hearings-But Are
They Fair?,29 VILL. L. REV. 1495 (1984).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Compulsory Arbitration.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: County.
CASE TYPES: Civil cases under $20,000.00.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Philadelphia County Court of
Common Pleas Arbitration Program.
DATA SOURCES: Questionnaires to all arbitrators concerning random cases process during July-December, 1983. 185
cases covered.
R. CONNER & R. SURETrE, THE CITIZEN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROGRAM:
RESOLVING DISPUTES OUTSIDE THE COURTS&ORLANDO, FLORIDA (1977).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Mediation.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Private (by the bar).
CASE TYPES: Minor criminal cases (ordinance violations and
misdemeanors).
PROGRAM EVALUATED: The Orlando Citizen Dispute Settlement Program.
DATA SOURCES: Post-mediation ratings of process by complainants, respondents, and hearing officers; follow-up client
interviews; program records.
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R. COOK, J. ROEHL & D. SHEPPARD, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS
FIELD TESTFINAL EVALUATION REPORT (1980).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Neighborhood Justice Center
(Mediation).
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Private (court referral).
CASE TYPES: Interpersonal disputes in domestic, neighbor,
family, and other close relationships which may be civil or criminal in nature; civil disputes between tenants and landlords;
consumers and merchants, employees and employers, others.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Atlanta, Kansas City, and Los Angeles (Venice/Mar Vista) Neighborhood Justice Centers.
DATA SOURCES: Includes interviews with mediation clients
regarding their experiences and satisfaction with the process
and the durability of their agreements (Pearson, 1982).

Davis, Mediation: The Brooklyn Experiment, in NEIGHBORHOOD
ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING IDEA 154-170 (1982).

JUSTICE:

TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Mediation.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Private (court referrals).
CASE TYPES: Custodial Felony Arrests.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Brooklyn Dispute Center.
DATA SOURCES: Interviews with victims before, after, and
four months following.
W. FELSTINER & L. WILLIAMS, COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN DORCHESTER,
MASSACHUSETTS (1980).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Mediation (two person panel).
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Limited jurisdiction county (municipal) courts.
CASE TYPES: Interpersonal and property disputes (petty
criminal cases) where the victim and defendant are not
strangers.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Dorchester (Mass.) Urban Court
Program.
DATA SOURCES: 1) Interviews with project staff and
mediators. 2) Program files on first 500 cases. 3) Observation
of 34 mediation sessions. 4) Surveys of disputants and
mediators. 5) Caseload information regarding case volumes,
dispositions, and costs (Pearson, 1982).
Felstiner & Williams, Community Mediation in Dorchester, Massachusetts, in
NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING IDEA 111-153
(1982).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Efficiency, Quality.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Minor criminal offenses.
Hannigan, The Newspaper Ombudsman and Consumer Complaints: An Empirical Assessment, 11 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 679 (1977).
TECHNIQUE
EVALUATED:
Ombudsman
(private
newspaper).
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Private.
CASE TYPES: Consumer complaints.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: "Sound Off" in the London (Canada) Free Press.
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DATA SOURCES: Random sample of 282 residents who made
a written complaint to one newspaper ombudsman.
D.

HEINTZ, AN ANALYSIS

OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ARBITRATION

(1977).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Arbitration.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Private.
CASE TYPES: Medical malpractice.
DATA SOURCES: Admissions data from two hospitals over an
eight year period; insurance company records.
D. HENSLER, A. LIPSON & E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: THE FIRST YEAR (1981).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Court-annexed arbitration.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: State.
CASE TYPES: Civil cases under $15,000.00.
DATA SOURCES: Evaluation of the first year ofjudicial arbitration in the superior courts of six California counties. Includes an analysis of caseload information regarding case
volumes, dispositions, and costs.
D. HENSLER &J. ADLER, COURT-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION: AN ALTERNATIVE FOR CONSUMER DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1983).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Court-annexed arbitration.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: State.
DATA SOURCES: Case characteristics drawn from court
records, interviews with litigants.
PROJECT

M. JACOUBOVITCH & C. MOORE, SUMMARY JURY TRIALS IN THE NORTHERN

(1982).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Summary jury trial.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Federal.
CASE TYPES: Various civil cases.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Federal District Court, Northern
District of Ohio.
DATA SOURCES: Questionnaires to attorneys, jurors and
magistrates.
Kritzer & Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative Analysis of
Case Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost In the American Arbitration
Association and the Courts, 8 JUST. Sys.J. 6 (1983).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Arbitration.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Private.
CASE TYPES: Tort or commercial contract cases over $1,000
or of "significant non-monetary issue."
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Federal trial courts, state trial
courts, and AAA arbitration in eastern Wisconsin, eastern
Pennsylvania, central California, New Mexico and South
Carolina.
DATA SOURCES: 1) Court Records from five federal judicial
districts. 2) Court Records from state trial courts from the
same five districts. 3) American Arbitration Association
records from the same five districts. 4) Interviews with lawyers.
Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute
DISTRICT OF OHIO
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Resolution: A Report to the JudicialConference of the United States Committee on
the Operation of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1985).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Summary Jury Trial.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Federal.
CASE TYPES: Negligence, products liability, personal injury,
contract, discrimination, antitrust.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Summary Jury Trials in the Northem Federal District of Ohio.
DATA SOURCES: Court statistics for 1983 and 1984, Northern Federal District of Ohio. Disposition of cases referred to
Summary Jury Trial. Average juror time and costs required for
SJT and for full jury trial.
A. LIND &J. SHAPPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN
THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Court-Annexed Arbitration.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Federal.
CASE.TYPES: Contract and tort under $150,000.00.
DATA SOURCES: Includes an analysis of caseload information regarding case volumes, dispositions and costs.
Maddi, The Effect of ConciliationCourt Proceedingson Petitionsfor Dissolutionof
Marriage, 13 J. FAM. L. 767 (1977).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Conciliation (mediation).
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Limited jurisdiction state court
annexed.
CASE TYPES: Divorce filings requesting conciliation services.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Los Angeles County Conciliation
Court.
DATA SOURCES: California Bureau of Vital Statistics, The
Family Law Department's case files, The Conciliation Court's
records, private disputant questionnaires; sample of 6,682
cases.
McEwen & Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237 (1981).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Adjudication, Mediation.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: State.
CASE TYPES: Civil Disputes under $800.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Biddeford, Lewiston, and Waterville (Maine) District Courts and their annexed mediation
programs.
DATA SOURCES: Includes follow-up interviews with disputants in both mediated and adjudicated cases.
McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance
Through Consent, 18 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 11 (1984).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Mediation.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: State.
CASE TYPES: Civil Disputes under $800.00.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Biddeford, Lewiston, and Waterville (Maine) District Courts and their annexed mediation
programs.
DATA SOURCES: Interviews with litigants, observations of
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court and mediation sessions, analysis of docket book information, and analysis of state court mediation reports.
S. MERRY & A. ROCHELEAU, MEDIATION IN FAMILIES: A STUDY OF THE

(1985).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Mediation.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Local.
CASE TYPES: Family conflicts involving rebellious and truant
adolescents.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: The Denver, Colorado Children's
Hearing Project.
DATA SOURCES: Background data on sample of disputants,
program and court file statistics, surveys of mediators. Interviews of family members, mediators, social workers, and school
and court personnel. Observation of mediation and court
sessions.
Pearson, Child Custody: Why Not Let The Parents Decide?, 20 JuDGEs J. 4
(1981).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Voluntary mediation.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: County.
CASE TYPES: Divorce (contested custody and visitation).
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Denver Mediation Custody Project.
DATA SOURCES: 436 cases: 310 mediation, 126 control
group. Disputant interviews before, immediately after, 6-12
month follow-up; court case-filing records.
Pearson & Thoennes, Mediation and Divorce: The Benefits Outweigh the Costs,
4 FAM. ADVOC. 26 (1982).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Adjudication; Mediation.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Community, but cases courtreferred.
CASE TYPES: Contested child custody and visitation disputes.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: The Denver Custody Mediation
Project.
Pearson & Thoennes, Mediating and LitigatingCustody Disputes: A Longitudinal Evaluation, 17 FAM. L. Q. 497 (1984).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Mediation.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Private (sponsored by the local
bar and The Piton Foundation).
CASE TYPES: Child Custody.
PROGRAM
EVALUATED:
Denver Custody Mediation
Project.
DATA SOURCES: 436 cases: 310 mediation, 126 control
group. Disputant interviews before, immediately after, 6-12
month follow-up; court case-filing records.
Roehl & Cook, The NeighborhoodJustice Centers Field Test, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING IDEA (1982).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Neighborhood Justice Center.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Local.
CASE TYPES: Interpersonal disputes, civil disputes, consumer
disputes.
DATA SOURCES: Various.
CHILDREN'S HEARINGS PROJECT
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Rolph & Hensler, Court-OrderedArbitration: The California Experience, 3
CIV. JUST. Q. 163 (1984).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Court-annexed arbitration.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: State.
CASE TYPES: Civil cases under $15,000.00.
DATA SOURCES: Court and program statistics.
Rosenberg & Schubin, Trial By Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of Small
Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARV. L. REV. 448 (1961).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Compulsory arbitration.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Municipal.
CASE TYPES: Small claims cases under $2,000.00.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Compulsory arbitration program
of the Philadelphia Municipal Court.
DATA SOURCES: Municipal Court statistics (1955-1958) and
judge's worksheets from the Arbitration Commission in
Philadelphia.
M. ROSENBERG, PRETRIAL CONFERENCES AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Pre-trial Conferences.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: State.
DATA SOURCES: Court records, court clerks' entries on special record sheets, questionnaires from judges and lawyers.
H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS

(1970).

TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Bilateral settlement.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Private.
CASE TYPES: Bodily injury claims.
DATA SOURCES: Interviews with insurance company claims
adjusters, observations of adjusters at work, plaintiff attorney
interviews and insurance company claims files.
Ross, Insurance Claims Complaints: A Private Appeals Procedure, 9 LAw &
Soc'Y REV. 275 (1975).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Private appeals procedures.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Private.
CASE TYPES: Insurance claims.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: A large, traditional insurance
company.
DATA SOURCES: Insurance company appeals files.
Ross & Littlefield, Complaint as a Problem-Solving Mechanism, 12 LAw &
Soc'Y REV. 199 (1978).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Complaint.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Private company.
CASE TYPES: Consumer complaints.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Complaint handling at Western
Television and Appliance, a 7-store chain in Denver, CO.
DATA SOURCES: Interviews with business employees and
management, observations, company and Better Business Bureau records on complaints, customer questionnaire.
Seltzer, California'sPilot Project in Economical Litigation, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
1497 (1980).
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Adjudication (streamlined
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED:
procedures).
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: State courts.
CASE TYPES: All civil actions filed in the participating municipal courts except for small claims actions and special proceedings plus all cases filed in the superior courts seeking less than

$25,000.00.
K.

SHUART, THE WAYNE COUNTY MEDIATION PROGRAM IN THE EASTERN

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

(1985).

TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Mediation-Arbitration.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Federal.
CASE TYPES: Civil cases concerning money or division of
property with valuation over $10,000.00.
DATA SOURCES: Interviews with judges, judicial staff, and attomeys; court calendar and case disposition statistics.
Shuart, Smith & Polanet, Settling Cases in Detroit: An Examination of Wayne
County's "'Mediation"Program, 8 JusT. Sys. J. 307 (1983).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Mediation (panel valuation of
case).
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: State.
CASE TYPES: Civil cases concerning money or division of
property with valuation over $10,000.00.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: Mediation Tribunal Association,
with board ties to the Wayne County (Mich.) Circuit Court.
DATA SOURCES: Review of mediation and disposition information for more than 200 cases, interviews with 120 attorneys
and a number of Circuit Court judges, and observation of several mediation hearings.
Singer & Nace, Mediation in Special Education: Two States' Experiences, 1
OHIO ST. J. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 55 (1985).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Mediation.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: State (education agencies).
CASE TYPES: Complaints by parents of handicapped children
concerning quality of education.
PROGRAM EVALUATED: State education agencies in Massachusetts and California.
DATA SOURCES: Case statistics, interviews with parents, education agency representatives and mediators.
Snyder, Crime and Community Mediation__The Boston Experience: A Preliminary Report on the Dorchester Urban Court Program, 1978 WIs. L. REV. 737.
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Mediation.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Local.
CASE TYPES: Petty criminal cases and other referrals.
DATA SOURCES: Dorchester Urban Court Program case
statistics.
Vidmar, Assessing the Effects of Case Characteristics and Settlement Forum on
Dispute Outcomes and Compliance, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 155 (1987).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Mediation.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: State.
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DATA SOURCES: Court statistics regarding case characteristics, forum characteristics, and outcome characteristics.
Weller, Ruhnka & Martin, American Experiments for Reducing Civil Trial
Costs and Delays, 1 CIV. JUST. Q. 151 (1982).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Compulsory arbitration; case
load management and mediation.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Municipal.
CASE TYPES: All civil cases under $6,000 except eviction and
small claims (Rochester, NY); all civil cases under 25,000 (Los
Angeles, CA).
DATA SOURCES: Rochester and Syracuse: Systematic samples of court case filings for 1968, 1972, and 1977 in both
courts; personal interviews with judges and court staff; mail
questionnaires sent to a sample of 300 attorneys whose names
appear in Rochester arbitration case files. Los Angeles Municipal Court and Torrence Superior Court: A sample of 500 court
records from civil cases filed in 1976 and 1978; personal interviews with relevant court personnel in both courts; a mail survey of all attorneys in both courts whose names appeared in
our 1978 record sample.
Weller, Ruhnka & Martin, Compulsory Civil Arbitration: The Rochester Answer to Court Backlogs, 20 JUDGES J. 3 (1982).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Arbitration.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Local.
CASE TYPES: Civil cases under $6,000.00.
DATA SOURCES: Evaluation of the Rochester compulsory
civil arbitration program. Includes follow-up interviews with
disputants in both mediated and adjudicated cases. Case
records, interviews with judges and court staff; questionnaires
from attorneys.
Whitford & Kimball, Why Process Consumer Complaints? A Case Study of the
Office of the Commissioner of Insuranceof Wisconsin, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 639.

J. WOLF &

S. LUND, EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AS A MEANS OF RESOLVING

(1985).
TECHNIQUE EVALUATED: Mediation.
PROGRAM JURISDICTION: Private.
CASE TYPES: Employment discrimination.
DATA SOURCES: Court and program statistics and follow up
questionnaires.
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II.

OTHER CASE STUDIES

Buckle & Thomas-Buckle, Doing Unto Others: Dispute and Dispute Processing
in an Urban American Neighborhood, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING IDEA

78-90 (1982).

Engel, Cases, Conflict, and Accommodation: Patterns of Legal Interaction in an
American Community, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 803 (1983).
Erlanger, Chambliss & Melli, Participation and Flexibility in Informal
Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 585
(1987).
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Felstiner & Williams, Mediation as an Alternative to CriminalProsecution: Ideology -andLimitations, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAVIOR 223 (1978).
Friedman & Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San
Benito Counties, 10 LAw & Soc'y REV. 267 (1976). Lempert, More Tales of
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Courts, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 91 (1978).
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9 JUST. SYs.J. 151 (1984).
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